Abstract
This article examines the resurgence and development of transnational Islamic movements in the post-reform era by analysing the case of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). It argues that HTI’s emergence and rapid expansion is intertwined with global and Indonesian socio-political contexts. While the global factor of the Iranian revolution of 1979 inspired the revival of Islam as a social, political, and cultural force in Muslim countries, the changing political situation in Indonesia — from authoritarianism to the reform era — supported the growth and expansion of HTI in major universities in Indonesia. Although HTI gradually grew after its arrival in 1980s, it only emerged into the public view in 2000 when it hosted the first International Caliphate Conference in Jakarta. HTI’s emergence was part of a broader proliferation of Islamic radical groups, which took place following the end of the Soeharto regime in May 1998. This article discusses how this movement operated underground through preaching groups on campuses, established media operations, and organised rallies in support of a global caliphate in Indonesia. By looking at national and local levels, this study suggests that, in the newly democratic political sphere, HTI won the support of ordinary Indonesian people by engaging with national and local issues as part of efforts to achieve its agenda of establishing shari’a and a global caliphate.

Keywords: Emergence, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Caliphate, Islamic Study Clubs, Post-New Order
Introduction

The topic of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia — also referred as ‘Islamic fundamentalists’, ‘Islamists’, ‘militants’, and ‘hardliners’ — has received significant attention from scholars and observers. These movements have gone through a particularly significant expansions phase since the resignation of former president Soeharto in 1998. This topic generated even more interest after bombings Indonesia from 2002 to 2005 revealed the existence of an Islamist terrorist network in Southeast Asia, called Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Various studies have been produced in response to the emergence of Islamic radical movements and terrorist groups. However, a lack of knowledge regarding the dynamics of Islamic movements in Indonesia has resulted in misunderstandings and generalisations.

Radical Islamic movements in Indonesia can be broadly categorised into local and transnational variants. Local groups have emerged as a response to political and social changes throughout Indonesian history, but generally have not adopted values from or developed global ties to similar movements in the Middle East. This category includes the Darul Islam movement in West Java, Aceh and South Sulawesi during the 1950s and several Islamist movements that emerged in the post-Soeharto reform era, such as the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI) and the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI). These groups were shaped entirely by Indonesian socio-political contexts and have no clear reference point to any particular movement in the Middle East in terms of their ideology or organisation. Their struggle is limited to Indonesia, although they may share a global agenda with other Islamist groups, namely the implementation of shari’a (Islamic law) or the establishment of an Islamic state. Transnational Islamist groups, on the other hand, draw direct inspiration, ideas, ideology, methods and networks from movements in other parts of the world as a result of globalisation and movement of people. In this respect, to borrow Mandaville’s words, their “primary modes of organisation and activism transcend the territorial boundaries of nation states” (Mandaville 2007). In the Indonesian context, international movements include Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Salafi groups, Jemaah Tabligh, and Jemaah Tarbiyah. These movements all have their origins in the Middle East and South Asia.

Focusing on HTI, this article argues that this group’s emergence and rapid development is intertwined with global and Indonesian socio-political contexts. Facing repression from the authoritarian state in Soeharto’s New Order era, HTI operated underground and focused on education through its halqa (study circles) and confined its activities to university campus mosques. However, after the fall of Soeharto, HTI emerged publicly, utilising the new democratic environment to advance its cause by conducting various rallies, producing media and hosting seminars and discussions in order to disseminate its ideas and gain public support.
The first section of this article deals with the origins and ideology of the global Hizbut Tahrir (HT) movement. The second section discusses the history of HT in Indonesia and its development from the New Order era to Post-New Order era and explores associated socio-political contexts. The third section deals with the emergence and development of HTI in a local context, with reference to HTI in South Sulawesi.

**Hizbut Tahrir: Origins and Ideology**

Hizbut Tahrir was founded in East Jerusalem in 1953 by Palestinian Islamic legal scholar and political activist, Taqiyyuddin An-Nabhani (1909-1977). An-Nabhani studied law at al-Azhar University in Cairo, and later worked as a religious teacher in a high school, a chief clerk and then as a judge in the Islamic courts in Palestine (Taji-Farouki 1996). Some writers suggest that he was a sympathiser, if not a member, of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), an Islamist movement founded in Egypt in 1928. It is likely that An-Nabhani engaged with MB ideas during his study in Egypt, as the impact of MB’s influence can be seen in his political and religious thought, especially related to the concepts of Islam’s comprehensive nature and its potential as a solution for the umma in the face of political, economic, social or cultural challenges. In addition, An-Nabhani was also attracted to the ideals of the Syrian Ba’th party which promoted Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism, while basing his political views on Islam rather than secularism (Taji-Farouki 1996). An-Nabhani referred to HT as an Islamic political ‘party’ rather than an Islamic organisation, following the trend of emerging Arab political parties since the 1930s. Related to this, Suha Taji Farouki regards An-Nabhani as “one of the first Arab intellectuals to argue the case for a modern political party using the constructs of Islamic discourse” (Taji-Farouki 1996).

The establishment of HT was An-Nabhani’s response to Western colonialism which had led to the fall of caliphate, the loss of Palestine and the dividing up of Arab-Muslim countries into various nation-states. His primary concern was, therefore, to unite Arab-Muslim countries under a single caliphate (Taji-Farouki 2000). In many of his works, An-Nabhani shows a pre-occupation with liberating Muslim countries from Western imperialism. In his *Mafahim Hizbut Tahrir* (Understanding Hizbut Tahrir) he wrote:

“...It (HT) stands against colonialism in all its forms and aims to liberate the umma from the colonialist intellectual leadership and to remove its cultural, political, military and economic influences from the Islamic lands. It also aims to change erroneous and distorted concepts spread by colonialism which restrict Islam to personal worship and morals” (An-Nabhani).

It is also worth noting that An-Nabhani’s took a far more radical approach to the West than the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna, since he
established a clear dichotomy between Islamic and Western civilisation, preceding the same division outlined by another future MB leader, Sayyid Qutb, who described the divide as being one between Islam and *jahiliyyah* (‘ignorance’). In this regard, An-Nabhani conceived of Islam as a ‘self-sufficient principle’, a ‘comprehensive and thoroughly modern ideology’ and superior to other ideologies originating from the West, i.e., capitalism and socialism (Taji-Farouki 1996).

HT is a transnational Islamist movement with a distinctive political orientation. In contrast to other Islamist groups, HT declares itself to be a political group, not an intellectual, spiritual or a social organisation (Hizbu Tahrir 2000). However, it does not engage in electoral politics, since it explicitly rejects democracy. HT views democracy as a ‘system of non-belief’ (*sistem kufur*) which contradicts Islam. For HT, Islam recognises only God as the maker of laws, not human beings. Therefore, HT regards democracy as *haram* (prohibited) for Muslims and they are forbidden from adopting and promoting it (Hizbu Tahrir 2000; Zallum 1994). Opposing the separation between religion and state, HT views politics as any effort to care for and maintain society in accordance with Islamic law and the solutions provided by Islam (Hizbu Tahrir 2000). This is in accordance with the stated aim of HT, namely “to resume the Islamic way of life and to convey the call of Islam to the world.” This, for HT, means “bringing Muslims back to living an Islamic way of life in *Dar al-Islam* (the domain of Islam) and in an Islamic society in which all of life’s affairs in society are administered according to the rules of *shari’i’a*, regarding what is *halal* (lawful) and *haram* (prohibited) under the protection of the Islamic state, which is the Khilafah, the Caliphal state” (Hizbu Tahrir 2000). Thus the restoration of the caliphate, in HT’s view, is essential in order to achieve the glory of Islam.

The re-establishment of the global caliphate (*khilafah*) is the major emphasis of HT’s struggle, and due this, Peter Mandaville (2007) identifies HT as a ‘*khilafist*’ group. According to An-Nabhani, the caliphate of the Ottoman Empire, which was abolished in 1924, was the only authentic form of Islamic government to have a historical and doctrinal basis. Its restoration was axiomatic to ensure the comprehensive implementation of *shari’i’a*. If an Islamic state under the rule of a caliph were re-established, it would spread Islamic ideas and precepts all over the world, “restoring the *umma* to its golden age as dominant in the world and spearheading a mission to liberate the globe from the evils of capitalist hegemony” (Taji-Farouki 1996). An-Nabhani (2007) asserted that the appointment of a caliph is an obligation upon Muslims. Although the form of Islamic government is deeply contested among Muslim scholars, An-Nabhani interpreted the caliphate as an obligation confirmed in the Qur’an, Hadith and Consensus of the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad (*Ijma’*). This is because various *shari’i’a* duties, such as the upholding of Islamic norms, the implementation of a penal code and defending the state rely on the presence of a caliph. To advance his cause, An-Nabhani (2008)
included in his book a detailed state constitution describing its political, social and economic systems, as well as educational and foreign policies.

HT can be classified as radical in terms of its political ideas but focuses on peaceful means to achieve its goal by emulating the Prophet’s model of propagation (da’wa). HT is radical in so far as it favours fundamental political change through the replacement of existing nation-states and the creation of a new Islamic superstate under one central ruler (Karagiannis and McCauley 2006). Differing from the Muslim Brotherhood, HT opposes gradualism (tadarruj) arguing that this approach suggests Islam is weak and impractical. Although HT claims to be anti-violent, the movement was involved in masterminding two attempted coups by sections of the armed forces of Jordan during 1968 and 1969 (Taji-Farouki 1996). Moreover, several HT members have been arrested in Central Asia over allegations of involvement in acts of violence. However, in the case of Indonesia, there has been no evidence to suggest links to violence or terrorism. One should refer to HT’s ideology to understand its activism and possible connection with jihadi action. Referring to the experience of the creation of an Islamic state in the period of the Prophet Muhammad, HT has envisaged three stages of political struggle:

1. **Culturing**: “Finding and cultivating individuals who are convinced by the thought and method of the party. This is necessary in order to formulate and establish a group capable of carrying the party’s ideas.”

2. **Interaction with the Ummma**, in order to encourage the umma to embrace Islam, so that it works to establish Islam in life, state and society.”

3. **Seizing the Government**: “Establishing an Islamic state, implementing Islam generally and comprehensively and carrying its message to the world (Hizb ut-Tahrir 1999).”

These stages imply that the struggle for a caliphate should take a bottom-up approach. It is therefore easy to understand why the movement actively recruits, cultivates and promotes its ideas through media, pamphlets, seminars and rallies as part of the first and second stages of this approach.

Since the beginning, HT leaders and members have faced challenges and crackdowns that have resulted in a worldwide diaspora of its members. An-Nabhani himself experienced harsh repression at the hands of the Jordanian government: he was arrested on charges of subversion after submitting an application to register HT as a political organisation (Fealy 2007). This led him to live into exile in Jerusalem, Syria and Lebanon while disseminating his ideas and establishing HT chapters. An-Nabhani passed away in Beirut in 1977 and was succeeded as supreme leader by Abdul Qadeem Zallum, who was then followed by Ata Abu Rashta in 2003 (Hizbu Tahrir 2009). Many of An-Nabhani’s followers faced repression in the Middle East, forcing them to flee to Western countries. Since the early 1990s,
Hizbut Tahrir has expanded quickly into Central Asia, North Africa, Turkey, Europe and Southeast Asia (Fealy 2007). While Jordan probably serves as the main base of the movement, the UK has been regarded by many as the new HT headquarters and base of operations. HT itself has claimed to have branches (*wilayah*) in forty countries, making it a global movement with a strong world-wide network.

**Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: The Origins, Socio-Political Context and Early Development of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia**

The arrival of HT in Indonesia is linked to the HT community in Australia in the early 1980s. Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi and Mama Abdullah Nuh were two figures who played an important role in the expansion of HT in Indonesia at this early stage (Salim 2005). Al-Baghdadi was an HT activist from Lebanon who had migrated to Australia in the early 1960s to escape persecution after he had reportedly joined the armed struggle against Israel (Fealy 2007). Meanwhile, Abdullah bin Nuh was head of the Al Ghazali *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) in Bogor, West Java. He was also a popular preacher and a Muslim scholar with expertise in Arabic literature, chairing the Faculty of Arts at The University of Indonesia (UI) in Jakarta. His acquaintance with HT began while visiting his son, who was studying in Sydney. Australia was one of the destinations for HT emigrants from the Middle East and it was among the community there that Nuh met the charismatic young teacher, al-Baghdadi. Nuh had deep discussions with al-Baghdadi and was impressed by the young preacher’s advanced knowledge of Islam. Nuh invited al-Baghdadi to visit Bogor in order to help him to develop his *pesantren* (Salim 2005; Fealy 2007). It was from here, then, that al-Baghdadi began to disseminate HT ideas in Indonesia.

Al-Baghdadi arrived in Indonesia in 1982 and spread HT’s teachings through Nuh’s *pesantren*. As part of his *da’wa* activities, he interacted with Muslim student activists at the Al-Ghifari mosque at the Bogor Agricultural Institute (*Institut Pertanian Bogor*, IPB), using the opportunities provided to introduce HT ideas to the students (Hardianto 2003). Since many students were attracted to al-Baghdadi’s *da’wa*, he and Nuh began organising recruitment and systematic education through training and *halqa* study circles (Fealy 2007). IPB’s mosque served as an early base for HT recruitment, with this later expanding into ‘secular’ university campuses in Java and Jakarta and then reaching areas outside Java through Campus Preaching Institutes (*Lembaga Dakwah Kampus*, LDK). However, al-Baghdadi and Nuh did not openly operate under the banner of Hizbut Tahrir in these early stages due to state suspicion and repression of political expressions of Islam in the early New Order era.

Although HTI gradually grew after its arrival in the 1980s, it only emerged into the public view in 2000 when it hosted the first International Caliphate Conference in Jakarta. HTI’s emergence was part of a broader proliferation of Islamic radical
groups, which took place following the end of the Soeharto regime in May 1998. The next section, therefore, will briefly outline the dynamic development of HT throughout the New Order era to the post-New Order era.

The Campus Da’wa Movement and HTI in New Order Era Indonesia

HTI’s emergence should be seen in the broader context of the development of preaching movements on Indonesian campuses in the 1980s. This was part of a broader Islamic resurgence among younger Muslims since the late 1970s, marked by a growing number of young people attending the mosques, not only to pray but also to learn about and discuss Islam. Moreover, many Islamic activities were organised by students at secular campuses and many female students, from senior high school to university, started to wear the veil (*jilbab*) (Rosyad 1995). In the 1980s in particular, various Islamic groups espoused a transnational ideology, known as *harakah* (‘the movement’), which began to take shape under various LDKs on campuses and in public mosques (Rosyad 1995). In contrast to the larger established traditionalist and modernist Muslim groups, these new groups lacked a social and cultural base in Indonesia and were more concerned with international issues. Because of their global orientation, one researcher referred to them as ‘global santri’ (Machmudi 2008).

The emergence of these campus preaching movements and young Muslims students’ attraction to Islam was a result of multiple factors. First, resurgent Islamic revivalism, marked by the 1979 Iranian revolution, had a profound impact on Islamic movements across the world, including those in Indonesia. This globally significant event opened the eyes of young Muslims in Indonesia and elsewhere to the possibility that Islam could serve as a counter to the Western ideologies that dominated the Muslim world. The influence of the revolution could be seen in the early 1980s when many female students began to don the *jilbab* — at the time a new style of clothing which was adopted from Iran (Brenner 1996). Translations of books of Iranian Shi’i radical thinkers such as Ali Shari’ati and Imam Khomeini also became available (Rosyad 1995). Indonesian Muslims, although they were majority Sunni, viewed the Iranian revolution as a triumph of Islam, seeing its universal spirit rather than focusing on theological differences. This phenomenon also contributed to the appeal of the preaching movements on campuses.

Second, the New Order state marginalised political Islam and suppressed student activism on university campuses. The relationship between Islam and the state, especially in the early 1980s, was characterised by opposition. As a result of Muslim rebellions in the 1950s, which had involved leaders of the leading Islamic party at the time, Masyumi, Soeharto consistently opposed any expressions of support for the idea of an Islamic state. The government was instead inclined to support cultural Islam — championed by noted public
intellectual Nurcholish Madjid in the 1970s with his famous slogan “Islam Yes, Islamic Parties No!” – while suppressing what Liddle referred to as ‘scripturalist Islam’ (Liddle 1996). In this respect, Soeharto appeared to emulate the old Dutch colonial policy of “emasculating political Islam while outwardly promoting its spiritual health” (Vatikiotis 1998). This was reflected in Soeharto’s policies such as eliminating Islamic symbols from the political sphere, banning Islamic-based political parties and forcing Muslim politicians out of the political arena. The de-politicisation of Islam reached its climax when Soeharto enforced a merger of all Islamic parties into the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) in 1973. Later in 1983, Soeharto also issued a regulation mandating that all parties and associations must adhere to Pancasila as their sole ideological foundation (Syamsuddin 2000). This regulation affected Islamic student organisations such as the Islamic Students Association (HMI) the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (PMII), the Muhammadiyah Student Movement (IMM) and the Indonesian Islamic Students (PII), which were forced to change their ideological foundation from Islam to Pancasila (Rosyad 1995).

Besides suppressing political Islam, the government also restricted student political activism. In 1977, for example, the Ministry of Education banned all student involvement in politics. This move was followed by the dissolution of Student Councils (Dewan Mahasiswa, Dema) in 1978 (Rosyad 1995). On 19 April 1978, the Ministry of Education issued a policy on the ‘Normalisation of Campuses’ (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus, NKK) and on 17 May 1978 outlined the concept of Campus Coordination Boards (Badan Koordinasi Kampus, BKK) (Damanik 2000). These policies placed the campus bureaucracy under the rectors and deans, enabling them to control student activities on campuses. As a result, students became inactive and no longer openly engaged in the social and political problems facing the nation. According to Rosyad, “their ideal intellectual and spiritual dimensions disappeared” (Rosyad 1995). Facing these restrictions, Muslim students attempted to find outlets through which they could express their ideas. It was at this time that university mosques became centres of student activities (Rosyad 1995). Vatikiotis (1998) cites Jalaluddin Rakhmat as saying, “the mosque became a sanctuary for the expression of political dissatisfaction and frustration.” This trend was particularly visible on the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) campus (Schwarz 1989). In the mosques, Muslim students could freely discuss and express their ideas about Islam and politics beyond the control of the state.

Third, the early emergence of these Islamic movements was facilitated by informal study clubs emulating the methods of the Muslim Brotherhood. These informal study clubs were initially organised by ITB lecturer Imaduddin Abdul Rahim (known as Bang Imad) who was interested in facilitating Islamic lessons for students. The
role of the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII) was crucial in supporting intensive training courses on campuses by providing preachers and funds (Bubalo and Fealy 2005). Bang Imad regularly held Islamic training sessions which he referred to as ‘LMD’ (Latihan Manajemen Dakwah, Preaching Management Training) which later evolved into the LDKs (Rosyad 1995). LMD was a type of training in which students studied intensively for about seven days without contact with the outside world. Students studied essential Islamic teachings, such as the sources of Islamic values, the Qur’an and Sunnah (Prophetic Tradition) and Islamic doctrine (Aqidah Islam) (Rosyad 1995).

Attracted to this kind of training, students from various universities in Bandung, Jakarta, Yogyakarta, Medan and other areas converged on the Salman Mosque of ITB. When these students returned to their home universities, they established similar activities on their own campuses (Rosyad 1995). It was from these groups that the Tarbiyah (‘education) Movement, Salafi groups and HTI emerged.

Given the authoritarian state’s repressive approach toward political expressions of Islam, HTI operated clandestinely. To avoid suspicion from the security services, HTI figures did not refer to HT in their publications and training courses, instead promoting the general idea of the need for the total implementation of shari’a and a caliphate (Fealy 2007). According to Ismail Yusanto, the government at that time never successfully detected HTI’s presence because its members kept such a low profile (Jamhari 2004). During the Soeharto period, HTI’s attention was focused on cultivating membership through halqa and expanding their networks among Muslim student activists. HTI was in the culturing stage (tatsqif) of the three methods of its da’wa. The organisation operated underground and was led by Abdullah bin Nuh until his death in 1987, after which he was succeeded by Muhammad Al-Khatthath (Salim 2005).

Since its inception, HTI developed through the LDKs alongside other Islamic movements. This was because HT arrived in Indonesia along with other harakah such as the Tarbiyah movement, Jama’ah Tabligh, and Salafi groups (Salim 2005). Initially, these movements cooperated with one another; their cadre training programs were held together with the same subjects and tutors. However, from 1988 divisions emerged among the movements as a result of sharpening ideological differences between them (Salim 2005). HTI used the LDK network as a channel for recruitment. In fact, the idea of establishing the LDK network was pioneered by leaders of HTI (Collins 2003). An LDK network on the IPB campus in Bogor, the Student Association for Islamic Propagation (Badan Kerohanian Islam Mahasiswa, BKIM) served as an important site for the earliest recruitment and dissemination of HT ideas. BKIM activists attended public sermons delivered by Abdullah bin Nuh and later joined the Al-Ghazali pesantren to learn from him and al-Baghdadi on a regular basis (Collins 2003). Having dominated the LDK in IPB...
Bogor, HTI activists then spread their wings by recruiting new members outside Bogor through the LDK network, such as the LDKs at Padjajaran University in Bandung, IKIP in Malang, Airlangga University in Surabaya, Hasanuddin University in Makassar and Gajah Mada University in Yogyakarta (Collins 2003; Hardianto 2003). After splitting from the other movements in LDK in 1994, HTI began to arrange its own public da’wa activities without referring to Hizbut Tahrir, while maintaining its network across the campuses. In this way, HTI activists created “undercover organisations and activities like seminars, weekly learning circles and the publication of books and pamphlets” (Salim 2005). However, HTI’s activities in this period were limited to disseminating ideas and recruiting, not yet extending to public mobilisations.

**HTI in the Post-Authoritarian Era: Towards Engaging with the Umma**

The fall of the Soeharto regime on 21 May 1998 paved the way for the relaxation of political rules and increasing democratisation in Indonesia. The newly expanded public sphere provided an opportunity for political Islam to emerge. While the expansion of political Islam could be seen in the proliferation of Islamic parties, several Muslim paramilitary groups and Islamic radical movements also emerged during this period. According to Effendy, the birth of these groups was not an immediate response to Indonesian’s new democracy but was rather more of a reaction to the socio-religious and political situation during the transition period, which these groups felt did not reflect Muslim aspirations (Effendy 2003). This included the state’s inability to deal with socio-religious conflicts, prevent gambling and prostitution and regulate alcoholic beverages. These newly emerging Islamic groups argued for the implementation of shari’a as an alternative system of government.

While many radical Islamic groups had already emerged into the public view in 1998, HTI only emerged later in May 2000, when it convened an international conference on the Islamic caliphate at the Senayan Tennis Indoor Stadium in Jakarta. This was the first public activity HTI conducted under the Hizbut Tahrir banner, openly introducing its ideas, programs and leaders (Salim 2005). The conference was attended by 5,000 HTI supporters and attracted extensive media coverage. Invited speakers included HT leaders from local and overseas branches such as Dr. Muhammad Utsman and Muhammad al-Khatthath (Indonesia), Ismail al-Wahwah (Australia) and Syarifuddin M. Zain (Malaysia) (Mohammad and Bakri 2000). The main issue discussed was the importance of reviving the Islamic caliphate as a solution to the problems faced by Muslims. Since 2000, HTI’s has undergone a noticeable expansion in its membership, media and operations. The movement has now moved from the education phase to next phase: engaging the umma.
Organising Rallies and Demonstrations

HTI’s most striking characteristic is its protest movement, taking the form of street rallies and demonstrations. Indeed, since the early 2000s, HTI has been one of the most active Islamist movements in Indonesia conveying its aspirations and demands through street demonstrations. In most cases, HTI rallies have been organised systematically at both the national and provincial level in response to national and international issues. In 2002, for example, HTI mobilised an estimated 12,000 members to stage a march in Jakarta from the National Monument to Senayan Stadium, demanding the implementation of shari’a law through the re-insertion of the Jakarta Charter into the constitution (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 2004). This was a domestic response to the annual session of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), which was deliberating this amendment to the 1945 Constitution. With regards to global issues, in 2003 HTI organised rallies outside the embassies of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, UK, the People’s Republic of China and France in protest against the US invasion of Afghanistan (Salim 2005). HTI also utilised Islamic celebrations to hold rallies in big cities on similar issues. On 4 January 2009, while commemorating the Islamic New Year, HTI also conducted rallies in several large cities across Indonesia condemning Israeli aggression in Gaza. In most of its rallies, HTI labels the capitalist system and Western ideas as being the source of the world’s problems and calls on Muslims to re-establish the caliphate as the only legitimate alternative to these political and economic systems.

Organising Public Seminars

HTI’s intellectual activities found their expression through seminars and publications. This was one strategy for HTI to disseminate its ideas and to win support from educated segments of Indonesian society. The organisation has been very active in convening events at international, national, provincial and local levels in response to global, national and local issues. For instance, HTI has hosted two international caliphate conferences in Jakarta in 2000 and 2007. The latter of these two conferences featured around 80,000 supporters and reportedly the largest HT conference in the world. More recently, since mid-2008, HTI has regularly convened monthly seminars at provincial and national levels, which they refer to as ‘Halqa Islam dan Peradaban’ (Seminars on Islam and Civilisation), addressing various current issues. On these occasions, HTI usually invites speakers including intellectuals, Muslim scholars and representatives of government as well HTI officials. However, most of the invited speakers usually present an Islamist point of view and are sympathetic to HTI’s views. Moreover, the issues raised and the discussions which took place during these events tended to be directed towards supporting HTI’s agenda. For many of its seminars, HTI contacts media outlets in order to raise its public profile and boost its reach.
Creating Media

HTI also utilizes media and publications as an intellectual means to promote its messages in the public sphere, helping the organization to maintain communication and unity of thought among its members. HTI’s media takes the form of pamphlets, bulletins, magazines, tabloids, booklets, books, DVDs and websites. Since 1994, HTI has published a weekly pamphlet, *Buletin al-Islam* (Bulletin of Islam), that was initially circulated only among HTI activists, with Salim (2005) noting that the pamphlet served as “their intra-group communication channel”. *Buletin al-Islam* continued to be quietly circulated underground until early 2000, when it was renamed to the much more identifiable *Syabab Hizbut Tahrir* (Hizbut Tahrir Youth). Since then, the bulletin, which comprises a four-page pamphlet, has been distributed publicly through mosques during Friday prayers every week (Fealy 2007). Another important HTI publication is *al-Wa’ie* (Awareness, Consciousness) a glossy monthly magazine which prints around 15,000 copies per edition (Fealy 2007). Since late 2008, HTI also began publishing a decent quality 32-page monthly tabloid called *Media Umat* (Media for the Muslim Community).

Translations of HT books and accounts of the group’s leaders, especially founder Taqiuddin An-Nabhani, are also important media sources for the group. HTI publishers include al-Izzah in Bangil, East Java, Pustaka Thariqul Izzah and Mahabbah Cipta Insani in Bogor, West Java, and more recently, HTI Press in Jakarta. The latter is specifically dedicated to publishing official HTI books (*mutabannat*) featuring updated revisions to key party documents from the HT central board. The *mutabannat* books refer to An-Nabhani’s most salient works, which are used in *halqa*. It is important to note, however, that HTI books and magazines are not publicly sold in bookstores; they have their own outlets, which suggests that the primary target consumers are HTI members. Like branches of HT overseas, HTI also has its own website, dating from 2004 ([www.hizbut-tahrir.or.id](http://www.hizbut-tahrir.or.id)), which enables members to access up-to-date information on HTI activities. The website features a mailing list, online HT books and weekly pamphlets which can be accessed for free.

HTI in South Sulawesi

HTI’s emergence in South Sulawesi is intertwined with the LDK network during the 1990s. Makassar, the capital city of South Sulawesi, has long been a key study destination for people from Eastern Indonesia, as it hosts a range of universities such as University Hasanuddin (UNHAS), the State University of Makassar (UNM), Alauddin State Islamic University (UIN), The University of Indonesian Muslims (UMI) and ‘45 University (Universitas ‘45), to mention a few. As discussed above, university campuses provided a base for Islamic movements developed through the LDK network. In Makassar in the early 1990s, LDKs were established on the
UMI and UNHAS campuses by LDK activists from West Java. However, in the earliest phase of its development, the LDK network was a loose association that accommodated students from all kinds of Islamic organisations. According to Hasanuddin Rasyid (2008), LDK activists on the UMI campus played a key role in introducing HTI ideas and establishing the organisation’s branch in Makassar. This was a result of the intensive interaction between LDK activists in UMI and those in Java. Rasyid recalls that in the early 1990s he and his friends from UMI’s LDK joined the Institute for Qur’anic Memorisation (Lembaga Tahfidzul Qur’an), a campus Islamisation program introduced by UMI Rector Prof. Dr. Abdurrahman Basalamah. As a part of the program, students received information about a month-long course in Arabic language being offered by the LDK based at IKIP in Malang, East Java. As they were interested in studying Islam and Arabic, 15 LDK activists, including Rasyid travelled to Malang to attend the course, during which they were introduced to the ideas of various Islamic movements, including those of Hizbut Tahrir (Rasyid 2008). Upon their return to Makassar and due to their increased interest in HT thought, in 1995 they established an Islamic forum. They promoted discussion of HT ideas, including Islamic doctrine, principles of shari‘a, world ideologies and the Islamic system of government, economy, and so forth (Badruzzaman 2008). This served as the embryo for the emergence of HTI in Makassar and South Sulawesi. At first, HTI activists restricted participation in their discussion groups to students on campus. Then, realising that HT’s struggle was focused on the establishment of an Islamic society and an Islamic state, LDK activists began to disseminate HT ideas outside the campuses. Badruzzaman notes that there were three key pioneers in the establishment of the HTI branch in Makassar: Ir. Hijrah Dahlan, Ir. Alimuddin, and Ir. Hasanuddin Rasyid.

A seminar on the caliphate, held at the UNHAS campus in 2000, served as the launch for the HTI Makassar branch. This event took place after HTI’s International Caliphate Conference in May 2000 in Senayan Stadium, Jakarta (Rasyid 2008). Around 1,000 people attended the HTI seminar in Makassar, including students and people from various segments of society (Badruzzaman 2008). The speakers in the seminar included Prof. Dr. H. Abdurrahman Basalamah (UMI Rector), Prof. Dr. Mattulada (UNHAS historian) and Dr. Utsman (HTI activist from Surabaya) (Rasyid 2008). Since then, HTI has operated publicly in Makassar, organising various activities to disseminate its ideas and attract public support.

As I established above, university campuses, especially the LDK network and study clubs, have served as HTI’s key recruitment and education base since the organisation first emerged in Indonesia. As I observed during fieldwork in Makassar, each university campus has a branch, or what are usually referred to as ‘HTI chapters’. Pamphlets displayed on campus information boards bear the name of each HTI chapter or its affiliated study clubs under different names. HTI
activists appear to dominate LDK campus activities in Makassar and therefore, as one HTI activist noted about her own campus at UMI, LDK tends to be synonymous with HTI (Rahmawati 2009). Furthermore, the LDK network organisation, the LDK Coordination Board (Badan Koordinasi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, BKLDK) is also dominated by HTI activists. LDK and the study clubs run by HTI usually host seminars and discussions on current issues as the first step in attracting students to join their ranks. From there, participants are introduced to HT ideas and later directed to become HTI members through set stages of indoctrination. The Liberation Student Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Pembebasan, GEMA Pembebasan) serves as a HTI youth wing, enabling expansion on the organisation across university campuses by dealing with political issues preferred by students. However, several activists have claimed that in late 2008 GEMA Pembebasan was converted into a HTI chapter following an edict from the HTI central board in Jakarta, which bears responsibility for expanding da’wa on campuses.

Besides LDKs and the HTI chapters, Islamic study clubs also play an important role in recruitment. Each campus has a different name for these study clubs: for instance, the study club on the UNM campus is called the Contemporary Islamic Studies ‘101’ Forum (Forum Studi Islam Kontemporer ‘al-Umdah’, Fosdik al-Umdah), while the club at the UMI campus is called the Ideological Islamic Study Forum (Forum Studi Islam Ideologis, FOSIDI). These forums are primarily focused on organising discussions and seminars on contemporary political and Islamic issues and producing bulletins and pamphlets which promote HT ideas among students. Those who take part in these discussions and show interest in the issues canvassed are often targeted for participation in HTI training and further halqa.

As a HTI branch, the South Sulawesi chapter includes Executive Committees at the Provincial (Dewan Pimpinan Daerah I, DPD I), District (Dewan Pimpinan Daerah II, DDP II) and Sub-District (Dewan Pimpinan Cabang, DPC) levels. DPD I’s consist of a chair, spokesperson, and five departments which include: Lajnah Tsaqafiyyah (Cultural Department), Lajnah Siyasiyyah (Political Department), Lajnah Maslahiyyah (Welfare Department), Lajnah Fa’aliyyah (Administration Department) and Lajnah I’lamiyyah (Information Department) (Sukma 2008). In South Sulawesi, Sabran serves as head of DPD I, while Ir. Hasanuddin Rasyid serves as the spokesperson (Public Relations, HUMAS DPD I), although Rasyid (2008) has a more dominant role in representing HTI in public and media coverage. The same also applies for HT at the national and international levels. It is often difficult for researchers to interview the DPD I chair and the departmental chairs because the only channel for obtaining information is through the spokesperson, either at DPD I or DPD II level. Rasyid said that HTI has DPD IIs in almost all districts in South Sulawesi except Christian-majority districts such as Tana Toraja and Toraja Utara. HTI appears to have gradually expanded its foothold in South Sulawesi, branching...
out from the capital city Makassar to outlying districts and villages. Despite the growing membership of HTI in South Sulawesi, its membership is still relatively tiny. Based on my observation of a large rally conducted in Makassar, there are likely around 5,000 to 10,000 members of the organisation there.

Besides running intensive education programs for its members, HTI activists in South Sulawesi have organised various activities to attract broader public support. Formal activities range from peaceful demonstrations or rallies to intellectual activities, such as hosting seminars, discussions and workshops. *Bulletin al-Islam*, which is distributed by HTI activists every Friday at many mosques across South Sulawesi, especially in Makassar, is the most important media for propagating their views more broadly. The back page of the bulletin often contains information about HTI’s upcoming activities, which are open to the public. HTI’s South Sulawesi chapter has even organised public gatherings for the two key Muslim holidays in Indonesia (*Idul Fitri* and *Idul Adha*) offering up one of their members as the *khatib*, or preacher to provide a sermon. They also cooperate with several local radio broadcasts in Makassar such as al-Ikhwan, Barata, Merkurius, Smart FM, and Suara Celebes to deliver Islamic sermons (Rasyid 2009). Moreover, many HTI student activists publish their opinions in local newspapers.

## Conclusion

This article has discussed the origins, emergence and the development of Hizbut Tahrir, a transnational Islamic movement, in Indonesia. Examining HTI’s development, both in the political authoritarian and reform eras, suggests that its emergence and development has been shaped by the shifting nature of the Indonesian state. The emergence of HTI alongside other Islamist movements through Islamic study clubs (*halqa*) on tertiary campuses was closely tied to the Islamic resurgence of the late 1970s, spurred on by several factors. First, the global impact of the Iranian revolution of 1979, which inspired the revival of Islam as a social, political and cultural force in Muslim countries. Second, the authoritarian nature of the New Order regime, which launched repressive measures against political Islam and banned students from engaging in political activities on campuses. Students, therefore, utilised Islam as an alternative, focusing their activities inside campus mosques where they studied and discussed Islam through intellectual training programs and Islamic study clubs.

Religious activities on campuses were facilitated by Imaduddin Abdul Rahim, who emulated the teaching style of the Muslim Brotherhood. It was against this backdrop that HT was introduced to Indonesia by Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, a HT activist who was invited by Abdullah bin Nuh to develop his pesantren in Bogor. By engaging LDK-IPB Muslim student activists, these preachers disseminated HT ideas and organised *halqa*.
HTI remained a largely underground movement during the New Order era, focusing on recruitment and education as well as establishing a network of LDKs across university campuses in Indonesia. After the fall of Soeharto, HTI emerged from the shadows in 2000, hosting an International Caliphate Conference in Senayan Stadium, Jakarta. Since then, HTI has advanced its cause by establishing a central executive board and establishing branches in several provinces, producing high quality media, organising seminars and public discussions and conducting rallies in response to both national and international issues. Benefiting from the new democratic political system, HTI has managed to win the support of ordinary Indonesians by engaging with national and local issues to achieve its goal of establishing *shari’a* and a global caliphate.

**References**


Bubalo, Anthoni and Fealy, Greg. *Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia* (Australia: Lowy Institute, 2005).


Interviews
