Islam-based Civil Society and the State: Muhammadiyah's Engagement in Indonesian Local Elections

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Abstract

Religious organisations in Indonesia often forge close relations with the state, political leaders, and party elites. They devote much effort to gaining support from the state in order to protect their institutional interests. In this research, I consider Muhammadiyah's relations with the state in the context of the organisation's involvement in local politics and elections. I explore the nexus between institutional interest and epistemic influence, and the priority given to good state relations. This qualitative research uses data obtained through extensive literature study, analysis of election data, and in-depth interviews. This article argues that Muhammadiyah, as the second largest Islamic organisation with a vast network of educational, health and welfare institutions, places great store on having favourable links with the Indonesian state. Although rich in assets and financially secure, Muhammadiyah nonetheless requires access to state resources and goodwill from political and bureaucratic elites.

Keywords: Muhammadiyah, institutional interest, ideological consideration, politics, local elections

Introduction

As Indonesia's second largest Islamic organisation, Muhammadiyah's position has been an important factor influencing its relations with the state and political forces. Although Muhammadiyah is not a direct political player, it is reliant on the state for resources and regulatory approval to run its extensive educational, health and welfare services. Muhammadiyah's existence as an Islamic mass organisation cannot be separated from political and social dynamics in Indonesia. Since its establishment in 1912, the organisation has required a working relationship with the state and political forces. Muhammadiyah needs approval and cooperation from and with the state to deliver and run its programmes. If Muhammadiyah does not acknowledge the state's existence, the organisation will likely face difficulties running the programmes. This is because the state will stamp Muhammadiyah as an unregistered or illegal organisation. During Indonesia's Sukarno and Suharto eras, Muhammadiyah's dynamics could not be separated from the state, and it has relations with the government. The fall of Suharto in1998 and the following Reformasi period brought new volatility to Muhammadiyah's relations with the state, including the need for Muhammadiyah to navigate changes of government and dynamics within governments.

Although claiming neutrality and non-involvement in day-to-day politics, the role of Muhammadiyah in shaping political contestation has been long debated. Many scholars have argued that Muhammadiyah, after 2004, has adopted a neutral stance on politics and kept its distance from direct involvement in political parties.[1] Even though Muhammadiyah had a significant role in establishing the National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional*, PAN), the organisation officially maintains its impartiality, and many members of Muhammadiyah continue to aspire to focus more on social and religious activities rather than engaging deeply

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[1] For instance, Maarif 2015; Jung 2014.

in politics.[2] However, a large number of Muhammadiyah activists in regions outside Java have joined PAN over the years and become board members of this party.[3]

While this argument represents Muhammadiyah's official stance, different features emerge if we go deeper into the organisation's dynamics. Muhammadiyah members are diverse and have different political preferences. In dealing with political parties, members have joined a wide array of political parties, including PAN, United Development Party (PPP), Golkar, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*, PDIP), Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and Democrat Party.[4] A number of Muhammadiyah leaders also supported the formation of *Baitul Muslimin Indonesia* in 2007, the Islamic wing of PDIP. Moreover, some politicians from Muhammadiyah have been democratically elected as district heads and members of parliament, including some who were appointed as ministers under the governments of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Joko Widodo.[5]

However, being neutral or apolitical does not mean that Muhammadiyah leaders and members have no political ambitions. The organisation's leaders are widely known for forging close relations with the national-regional political leaders and the political party elites. They also play a strategic role in terms of political and social support. Muhammadiyah leaders often encouraged cadres to seek leading positions in political institutions such as parties, legislatures, and the executive,[6] and the relationship pattern between Muhammadiyah and political parties is not very rigid.[7] Thus, it can be said that such a relationship is not completely neutral nor partisan. In some cases, Muhammadiyah states its neutrality, but in other cases, it shows its

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[2] Jung 2009.

[3] Asyari 2009.

[4] Tanthowi 2008; Nakamura 2012.

[5] Jurdi 2010; Syaifullah 2015.

[6] Syaifullah 2015; Jurdi 2010; Mietzner 2009; Asyari 2009.

[7] Bush 2014.

support for certain political forces.[8] At the local level, Muhammadiyah's involvement in politics also varies, with some members directly involved in the local elections, while others prefer to remain neutral and indirectly involved.[9]

Given the importance of the state and decentralization politics in Indonesia in recent years, especially in relation to the role of socio-religious organisations, this research examines Muhammadiyah-state relations through its involvement in local politics, especially in local elections. This paper analyses the religious, social, economic, and political factors that influence the involvement of Muhammadiyah in local politics and elections. It examines how far institutional interest and epistemic influence become determinant factors in shaping the relationship between Muhammadiyah and the state. It asks why does Muhammadiyah involve itself directly in local politics and elections in some regions but not in others? What factors shape Muhammadiyah's involvement in local politics and elections? This research examines Muhammadiyah's engagement in local elections by comparing two districts in Java:Sleman and Bantul. Both regions are located in the Special Province of Yogyakarta, where Muhammadiyah was established and primarily developed.

Research Methods

This research employs qualitative methods, where data were collected through an extensive literature study, analysis of election data, and in-depth interviews. I interviewed six local leaders and thinkers of Muhammadiyah to gain detailed information about events, decisions, interactions with the state and political parties, and processes by which the organisation reaches certain decisions. In conducting interviews, I applied a semi-structured interview method because it is effective for interviewing elite individuals, enabling the researcher to be prepared

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[8] Hick 2012.
[9] Jurdi 2004; Solikhin 2015; Nurmandi et. al 2015; Sulistiyanto 2006.

without controlling the entire interview process.[10] I also conducted informal interviews with five Muhammadiyah youth leaders and thinkers in Yogyakarta as background information. I complemented interviews with key figures within Muhammadiyah with secondary methods of data gathering, including undertaking analysis of Muhammadiyah's relations with the state with the secondary method through analysis of the local election data, journal articles, media reports, and Muhammadiyah publications. All these documents are very valuable in understanding Muhammadiyah's thoughts and standpoints towards the state and its engagement in local politics and elections.

Data analysis in this article is achieved by descriptive studies, which combines all data from all sources, including documents, interview transcripts, and interview notes. All the data were sorted, organized, conceptualized, refined, and interpreted. I triangulated this information with other sources, such as comparing government documents, books, newspapers, research reports, and other relevant data.[11] I did not treat the interview results as taken for granted, but rather clarified and compared them with relevant data from election data, media reports, research reports, and Muhammadiyah publications. I also conducted cross-check data regarding some claims made by my informants.

Literature Review: Civil Society and the State in the Muslim World

Many scholars have written on the relationship between religious organisations, the state, and political parties. I will review some works of literature on the relationship of Islamic mass organisations, civil society, and the state, and why further empirical research is needed in this scholarship, including in Indonesia. The relationship between civil society (including religious organisations) and the state is complicated. Some

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[10] Bernard 2002.
[11] Wood 2009.

scholars, such as Linz and Stepan[12] and Diamond[13], argue that religious organisations must be separated and differentiated from the state, because if their relationships are tight, it will influence the autonomy of religious organisations and decrease their independence. The state potentially will co-opt religious organisations and exploit them to legitimize the state's interest. However, due to the state's development and political dynamics, I argue that religious organisations should be more flexible in their relations with the state. Religious organisations can cooperate with the state and become a complement to the state, while still criticising state policies.

Islamic organisations are an integral part of many societies. There are some similarities between Islamic organisations and civil society organisations, such as having independence from the state, mediating and balancing between society and the state, and promoting social virtues. Islamic organisations have played a substantial part in many countries as civil societies and social movements. For example, Norton argues that Islamic organisations are one important component supporting the existence of civil society in the Middle East.[14] He states that the vanguards of civil society have been human rights activists, religious movements, writers, and other groups that have insisted on government accountability and exposed the weaknesses of authoritarian regimes.

Although civil society's existence is crucial and recognised, there is scepticism from some Western scholars such as Gellner (1994), Huntington (1996), and Halliday (1996) about its presence in the Muslim world. This scepticism is built on the premise that Islam is not compatible with civil society because Islam's tenets do not support the values and principles of civil society. For example, Gellner states that Islam and civil society are not compatible because of the religion's norms and values. Civil society applies general norms while Islam often relies on religious

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[12] Linz and Stepan 1996.
[13] Diamond 1999.
[14] Norton 1993.

values.[15] In a society where religion is considered as a significant factor, such as in Muslim-majority countries, according to Gellner, individual autonomy is often restricted.[16] For Gellner, the absence of individual autonomy seriously impacts the existence of civil society, which requires independence and autonomy of individuals. In a similar vein, Huntington states that liberal democracy, which includes civil society, is not compatible with religious traditions of Islam.[17]

However, Gellner's argument about the absence of civil society in Islam is weak. The Muslim world is not monolithic, as Gellner argues; rather, it is dynamic and has many models of society. In his comprehensive study, Herbet challenges Gellner's argument by accentuating several points.[18] First, Herbet argues that Muslims in many worlds have accepted the value of modern political systems such as human rights, democracy, and civil society.[19] Second, Herbet reveals that the historical fact Gellner used is only a small part of Muslim societies. Although Islam was born in the Arabian Peninsula, more than one billion Muslims live beyond the Middle East, where states have absorbed democratic values and democratic political systems. Third, Herbet argues that Muslims in many Islamic worlds have proved their capability to join modern life and, more importantly, that "Islam has proven itself capable of mobilization as a public discourse without stifling but rather contributing to democratic pluralism".[20]

Islam and civil society are, in fact, compatible, as Herbet shows. Islam has normative norms that support civil society, as well as empirical facts about the practice of civil society. Islam as religion, according to Esposito, is an essential factor in the development of democracy and civil society, and it has become a key factor in the state and society

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[15] Ernest Gellner 1994, p. 15.
[16] Herbet 2003, p. 76.
[17] Huntington 1996.
[18] Herbet 2003, pp. 76-79.
[19] Herbet 2003.
[20] Herbet 2003, p. 76.

relationship.[21] For centuries, Islamic civilizations have developed their own concept of civil society and civility including a mechanism to control the state's power and to guarantee autonomy of society and its associates.[22] Meanwhile, in the contemporary era, there is increasing assertiveness of Islamic civil society among Muslims across Asia, where civil society is growing through Muslim voluntary organisations and Islamic mass organisations.[23] In many Islamic and Muslim-majority countries, civil society organisations also exist and develop through groups and institutions that enjoy a significant degree of autonomy from the state. Civil society organisations have developed strong presences across many countries in the Muslim world, such as Iran, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the Maghreb.[24]

While the scholars mentioned above have written works on the relationship between civil society and the state, and discussed the presence of civil society in the Muslim world, none have examined the relationship between religious organisations, the state, and political parties, which is central to the present study. Scholars have also not discussed factors and reasons why religious organisations are involved in politics. Therefore, a further study that explains and analyses why Islamic organisations engage in politics and to what extent institutional interest and epistemic factor influence their involvement in politics needs to be conducted. From an empirical perspective, this study on the relationship between Islamic mass organisations and the state in Indonesia, and how these interactions influence Indonesian politics and society, is also important in filling the gap in scholarship on the relationship between civil society and the state in the Muslim world.

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[21] Esposito 2003, p. 70.
[22] Nakamura 2001, p. 5.
[23] Nakamura et. al. 2001.
[24] Sajoo (ed.) 2002; Kamali 2001, pp. 458-459.

Muhammadiyah as Civil Society and Interest Group

In my research, I use the concept of institutional interest because it is important to understand religious organisations, as they have a wide array of interests. Religious organisations often make rational choices in protecting and expanding their interests. This concept is related to the important position of institutions because they shape the identity of actors, power, and strategies.[25] Institutional interest is a combination of rational choice theory and the theory of institutionalism. As Ostrom argues, rational choice institutionalism tries to understand the logic of institutionalism and institutional choice.[26] Hence, the concept of institutional interest places rational choice and institutional analysis as complementary theories.[27]

The interest-based theory from rationalist institutionalism can be used to understand organisation's political behaviour from an agency-based perspective. In this concept, the behaviour of religious organisations, civil society, and interest groups like Muhammadiyah can be examined by using the political economy of religion analysis and the logic of rational choice. This concept emphasizes the importance of agency and choice rather than ideological or theological consideration.[28] Studies from Kalyvas, Warner, Gill, and Iannaccone on Catholic Church politics indicated that religious organisations prioritise organisational survival and their institutional interest rather than preserving ideology.[29] I apply this concept to explain how Muhammadiyah, as a civil society and interest group, needs to have a harmonious relationship with the state at all levels of government to protect its members and social enterprises in education, health, and social services. The organisation needs to secure

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[25] Putnam 2004.
[26] Ostrom 1998.
[27] Ostrom 1998, pp. 242-243.
[28] Jung 2009.
[29] Kalyvas 1996; Warner 2000; Gill 1998 and Iannaccone 1998.

permits, social service funding, government policies, and strategic appointments for Muhammadiyah members.

The concept of epistemic influence refers to how ideologies are central to understanding politico-economic behavior because they provide values that support political action and decisions.[30] This concept explains theological and moral framing that determine the decisions of organisations and the behavior of actors. I apply this concept to show how Muhammadiyah uses ideology and religious considerations to make competing claims to authority in determining politics and specific issues, such as involvement in local politics and elections.

This article focuses on Muhammadiyah as the second-largest Islamic mass organisation in Indonesia. Muhammadiyah differs from 'regular' non-government organisations (NGOs), which are also part of civil society. While Muhammadiyah is also an NGO, it has different mechanisms and operates differently from other NGOs. As an NGO and member of civil society, Muhammadiyah is striving for civil society goals like other NGOs.[31] However, Muhammadiyah's position is distinct from most 'regular' NGOs, which usually avoid partnerships with the state and political parties. For NGOs, working with political parties and the state will restrict the spread of their ideas and the reach of their programs, and likely limit their independence.

As a civil society and interest group that runs numerous *amal usaha* (charitable institutions), Muhammadiyah often collaborates with the state, political parties, and the private sector. Muhammadiyah claims that working with the state and political parties does not compromise its self-autonomy as an Islamic organisation with broad cultural and social activities.[32] In Muhammadiyah's view, working with the state is complementary to running its programs. For example, to invigorate its

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[30] Adler 1986.
[31] Abdullah 2001, p. 48.
[32] Abdullah 2001, pp. 46-48.

social welfare initiatives such as schools and hospitals or clinics, working hand in hand with the government is beneficial for Muhammadiyah. Some Muhammadiyah's programs also conform with the state programs, particularly in education and health services. Muhammadiyah's relations with the state and political parties can be flexible depending on the political dynamics related to its vision and ends.

In the post-Reformasi era, Muhammadiyah has increasingly evolved to become an interest group, rather than a pure civil society like other NGOs. I will argue that this change in Muhammadiyah's orientation is because it has to protect and expand their institutional interests to ensure that they continue to receive financial favours and regulatory protections from the state.

Muhammadiyah's Involvement in Local Politics and Elections

I argue that Muhammadiyah's involvement in local politics has been shaped by institutional interest rather than epistemic influence. My research shows that Muhammadiyah leaders prioritise institutional interest over epistemic influence, as they want to foster good relations with the state. In some parts of the country, Muhammadiyah is involved in local elections because it has candidates with a high chance of winning, so its involvement is strategic for the development of organisation. Meanwhile, in other areas, Muhammadiyah has not been involved directly in local elections because a neutral position is more beneficial.

A close link between Muhammadiyah and politics has occurred not only at the national level but also at the local level. In many local branches, Muhammadiyah members support PAN and use the party as their political vehicle to run for office. For example, in Bima District, West Nusa Tenggara Province, PAN's establishment was strongly supported by Muhammadiyah's leaders and used the organisation's facilities.[33] In

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[33] Jurdi 2010, p. 400.

Yogyakarta, in the early years of Reformasi after 1998, Muhammadiyah had unofficial relation with PAN and used this party as a political vehicle at both the provincial and district levels.[34]

For example, in Kotagede, Bantul District, the mainstream leadership of Muhammadiyah went along with the organisationa's national and provincial leadership. They decided to support and establish the branch of PAN in Kotagede, and a significant number of Muhammadiyah cadres and activists in Kotagede supported the decision. However, at the same time, some Muhammadiyah activists in Kotagede were committed to supporting two other parties: PPP and PKS. Some even supported the Democrat Party in the 2004 and 2009 elections.[35] Similar trends were documented in other regions across the country, such as Ponorogo, Banyuwangi, Sleman, Maros, Bantul, and Kendal.[36]

Muhammadiyah's political engagement at the local level is closely related to decentralization and local elections. Decentralization is a political correction to the previous political system that was applied during the New Order regime, when regions did not have any political or economic autonomy because all policies were structured from the national level. The fall of Suharto's New Order in 1998 provided the Indonesian people with an opportunity to evaluate their political system and initiate massive structural, institutional, and cultural reforms. In 1999, laws were crafted to give more political power and autonomy to the regions, such as Law No. 22/1999 on local governance and Law No. 25/1999 on fiscal balance between the central government and regions. Both laws provided greater regional autonomy for local governments to govern.[37] Direct elections for provincial and district heads were the subsequent step of the decentralization process, beginning in January

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[34] Wardana 2014, p. 6.

[35] Nakamura 2012, pp. 365-366; Sulistyanto 2006, p. 260.

[36] Wardana 2014; Nurmandi et al. 2015; Sholikin 2015.

[37] Sulistyanto and Erb 2009, pp. 2-3.

2005 and still in place today. Since then, all district and provincial heads have been elected directly by people.[38]

Since decentralization, when direct elections for local leaders (*pemilihan kepala daerah*, often shortened to *pilkada*) have been held, some of the district boards of Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta took different positions from Muhammadiyah's central board (at national level), which decided to be neutral.[39] In local elections in Yogyakarta, several Muhammadiyah local boards, including those in Sleman District and Yogyakarta City, have issued policies to support candidates and directly engaged in politics. Compared to other local Muhammadiyah boards in Yogyakarta, the political support for candidates in Sleman and Yogyakarta City was more transparent and obvious. In Yogyakarta, Muhammadiyah's regional board issued a formal instruction to its members to choose a particular candidate who had a Muhammadiyah background.[40] The candidate was elected in 2006 but failed in their 2011 re-election bid.[41] In Sleman, a candidate supported by Muhammadiyah, has been successful elected repeatedly since 2005. Interestingly, Muhammadiyah's political decision received strong support from its members, especially from the youth. For them, the organisation's decision gave them moral support and backing to undertake new activities outside their routine programs,

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[38] Sulistyanto & Erb 2009, p.17.

[39] Regarding to the local elections for head regions, the Central Board of Muhammadiyah have issued Surat Keputusan Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah Nomor 41/KEP/I.0/B/2013 which is famous as SK-PP: 41. Surat Keputusan that was issued on 26 March 2013 regulated about the position and the role that can be taken by Muhammadiyah. In general, the central board of Muhammadiyah decided to keep being neutral in politics, but the interpretation and the operation of its neutral politics was given to the local leader of Muhammadiyah. The Central Board of Muhammadiyah gave autonomy for Muhammadiyah in local level to interpret and implement this decision.

[40] Interview with Arif Jamali Muis, Vice General Chairman of the Provincial Board of Muhammadiyah DI Yogyakarta, 05 May 2018. In Yogyakarta city, the candidate that was supported by Muhammadiyah used the slogan *"Menuju Kota Yogyakarta Berkemajuan". Berkemajuan* (with progress) is the slogan that is identical with Muhammadiyah.

[41] Suwarno, 2017, p. 417.

feeling they were enabled to contribute to the improvement of their region by campaigning for a strong candidate[42]

Muhammadiyah's Involvement in Local Politics in Sleman

The dynamics of local politics reveal that Muhammadiyah's regional board has become engaged in politics by supporting and campaigning for certain electoral candidates. In addition, the local boards not only supported a candidate for district head but also intensively supported and distributed its cadres to stand for election as local members of parliament.[43] In 2010, the local board of Muhammadiyah in Sleman (*Pimpinan Daerah Muhammadiyah Sleman*, PDM Sleman) gave support to Sri Purnomo and Yuni Satia, the candidate pair supported by PAN, PDIP, and Gerindra. This political support was followed by successful mass mobilization to vote for the candidate pair, leading to them winning 174,571 votes (35.18 percent).[44] Supporting a candidate and mobilizing the masses not only occurred in 2010, but had also happened in previous elections. In the first-ever local direct election for district head, held in 2005, PDM Sleman endorsed and supported the candidate pair of Ibnu Subiyanto and Sri Purnomo, who were nominated by PDIP and PAN. That year, PDM Sleman issued a *fatwa* (religious legal opinion) for its members to choose that particular candidate pair.[45] As a result, the pair won the election, receiving 39.6 percent of total votes.

Regarding the epistemic influence, several members of Muhammadiyah interviewed for this research claim that Muhammadiyah's political engagement in Sleman's local elections was based on moral and religious considerations. For PDM Sleman, the political decision to mobilize its members to endorse and vote for

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[42] Wardana 2014, p. 6.
[43] Sholikin 2015, p. 34.
[44] Nurmandi et. al. 2015, p. 116.
[45] Nurmandi, et. al. 2015, p. 122.

particular candidates stems from its mission to campaign for objectivity and morality in politics, namely through avoiding vote buying. The practice of vote buying in local elections is disadvantageous yet common across Indonesia. This political phenomenon has been a source of critique for district head elections,[46] critics of which argue that local elections have become a battleground for vote buying. Therefore, by endorsing and supporting particular candidates, PDM Sleman hopes to minimize the practice of vote buying. In order to make a good decision, before Muhammadiyah publicly declares its support for particular candidates, the organisation usually undertakes research and discussion about the individuals in question.[47] Muhammadiyah requires candidates to have a good track record and be 'clean'. Muhammadiyah believes that its political support has a religious dimension, which aligns with the organisation's mission of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* (encouraging virtuous conduct and discouraging evil deeds, or commanding good and preventing evil). As Muhammadiyah members are committed to following the regional board's instructions, the regional board hopes that the practice of vote buying can be eradicated, starting from within Muhammadiyah's own community.

However, information from the field shows that PDM Sleman's support for the particular candidates is primarily based on organisational considerations. By supporting a member of Muhammadiyah running for local election, the organisation becomes better equipped to mobilise its resources to win the election. In Sleman, Sri Purnomo is a Muhammadiyah cadre and a board member, and their successful bid in 2010 clearly benefited from Muhammadiyah's broad networks across villages and at the district level.[48] In this case, the regional board of PDM Sleman facilitated and created many opportunities and occasions for Sri Purnomo and Yuni Satia to raise public awareness of their candidacy. For example,

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[46] Aspinall et al. 2017.
[47] Rohmaniyati et al. 2005.
[48] Nurmandi et al. 2015, pp. 123-125.

PDM Sleman utilised the council of politics and public policy's serial discussions and religious gatherings to provide opportunity for Sri Purnomo to talk about about his programs and campaign for them. In addition to these events, Muhammadiyah formed the candidate's campaign team (*tim sukses*) that was led by Parwoto, a Muhammadiyah member and former Golkar party politician. The campaign team was formed to coordinate and mobilize sub-districts and villages based on Muhammadiyah's data.[49] Similarly, in 2001 and 2006, Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta supported Herry Zuhdianto in his bid for mayor because he was a Muhammadiyah cadre.[50]

The importance of Muhammadiyah's consideration of institutional interests is also demonstrated by the fact that key factor in Muhammadiyah's engagement in the Sleman elections is political bargaining. When Muhammadiyah supports a certain candidate, and that candidate wins the election, Muhammadiyah receives benefits from that success. For example, in Sleman, several Muhammadiyah board members and cadres received strategic positions in the new government's structure.[51] These positions included appointments as *camat* (sub-district head), hospital director, secretary to the sub-district head, head of a district government office, regional electoral board commissioner, head of local religious affairs office, and so on.[52] In 2015, the total number of Muhammadiyah cadres occupying strategic positions in the Sleman government was at least 11 people.[53] All received their positions because Muhammadiyah had contributed to the local elections.

Muhammadiyah's emphasis on institutional interests was also demonstrated by the organisation's perception that members' strategic

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[49] Ibid p. 126.

[50] Suwarno 2017, p. 417.

[51] Interview with Agung Wijayanto, a member of the regional board of Muhammadiyah Sleman and Vice Chairman of KNPI Yogyakarta, 7 May 2018.

[52] Interview with Anang Masduki, Vice Secretary of the Provincial Board of Muhamamadiyah DI Yogyakarta, 6 May 2018.

[53] Nurmandi et al. 2015, p. 134.

positions in Sleman district government bureaucracy would benefit its social welfare and education programs. By fostering a strong relationship with the government, Muhammadiyah can continue to effectively manage and implement its programs in Sleman. For example, Slemen's district head asked the organisation to recommend a candidate for the head of the education council; the district head also provided funding for the development of Muhammadiyah's schools.[54] This relation with Sleman district government is crucial for the organisation, because at the local level, Muhammadiyah requires government support, not just financially but also in terms of permits, human resources, and political support.[55] In addition, because the district head is a cadre and board member of Muhammadiyah, it has increased Muhammadiyah's confidence in being involved in politics and wider social life. Muhammadiyah could demonstrate to public that its cadre is the head of the district, which would further benefit Muhammadiyah's mission. This achievement is significant because Sleman is the only region in Yogyakarta where the district head also serves as a Muhammadiyah board member.[56]

For PDM Sleman, deciding to engage in local politics by supporting particular candidates positively impacts its social service provision in the education sector. One young Muhammadiyah member, who was part of the successful candidate's team, explained that Muhammadiyah benefited from this decision because their programmes and activities in Sleman need support from the government. Thanks to the decisions of the Sleman district head, PDM Muhammadiyah could work within the education sector of the local government.[57] For example, in the social service provision of the education sector, Muhammadiyah's schools in Sleman could begin recruiting teachers from civil servant rosters, which is usually only accessible by public schools. Being able to do so is valuable

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[54] Interview with Anang Masduki, 6 May 2018.
[55] Interview with Agung Wijayanto, 7 May 2018.
[56] Nurmandi et al. 2015, p. 123.
[57] Interview with Agung Wijayanto, 7 May 2018.

because it can reduce the running costs of Muhammadiyah's schools, as the government pays the civil servant teachers' wages, meaning Muhammadiyah does not have to expend its own funds. In other words, PDM Sleman's experiences shows that a good partnership with the local government can be important to sustain Muhammadiyah's education programs.

Muhammadiyah's support for the current district head of Sleman is also beneficial in developing the organiation's social welfare programs. It means that Muhammadiyah can more easily access subsidies and facilities for its charitable institutions, such as educational facilities, hospitals and health clinics, and orphanages. Due to the patron-client culture prevalent in many of Indonesia's government institutions, information about and access to government subsidies are typically limited to a small circle of the elite. These elites often implement bureaucratic and procedural mechanisms to distribute information about subsidies and facilities to people. In this regard, Muhammadiyah can now effectively assess the subsidies and facilities of social services because it has close ties with the Sleman district head.[58]

Obtaining direct access to the government is very strategic in cutting through Indonesia's lengthy bureaucratic procedures. For Muhammadiyah, direct access is worth the effort, as it makes the procedures for accessing social service provisions from the government easier. It also becomes more straightforward for Muhammadiyah to raise awareness of its programs and seek partnership with the government.[59] This is worthwhile because the local government has many programs related to Muhammadiyah, such as those in the education and health sectors. Therefore, Muhammadiyah can access an increased range of government subsidies.[60] For example, when of the district head Sleman

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[58] Interview with Agung Wijayanto, 7 May 2018.
[59] Interview with Agung Wijayanto, 7 May 2018.
[60] Interview with Budi Asyhari Afwan, activist of AMM (Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah) Yogyakarta and a former vice general chairman of Muhammadiyah Youth Yogyakarta, 2 May 2018.

attended the inauguration of PDM Sleman and the regional board of Aisyiyah Sleman[61] on 5 March 2016, he said that he was committed to building a partnership and working together with Muhammadiyah and Aisyiyah. The district head acknowledged the importance of Muhammadiyah in sustaining the development process in Sleman and asked Muhammadiyah to collaborate with the local government to develop Sleman in progressive manner.[62]

Political approval of its social welfare programs is also an institutional interest consideration for Muhammadiyah's engagement in direct elections in Sleman. It means that Muhammadiyah's support to its cadres in Sleman can help sustain its social service provision, as the presence of Muhammadiyah cadres in government and parliamentary structures benefits the organisation in gaining political approval. This is important because such approval usually results in financial contributions that expand Muhammadiyah's social welfare institutions.[63] For example, the district head of Sleman once stated in front of Muhammadiyah members and its sympathizers that he had big hopes for Muhammadiyah's schools. He expected Muhammadiyah to improve its schools' quality by implementing serious improvements and considering international standards. He added that the quality of the organisation's schools is very strategic for not just Muhammadiyah but also Sleman's government.[64] This is because disharmony between the government and Islamic organisations could hurt the organisation's programmes. For example, during the Yudhoyono presidency, because of disharmony between Yudhoyono and Muhammadiyah, the organisation rarely received support

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[61] Aisyiyah is the women's wing of Muhammadiyah.
[62] http://www.suaramuhammadiyah.id/ 2016/ 03/ 05/ hadiri-pelantikan-bupati-sleman-ajak-pdm-sleman-majukan-daerah/
[63] Interview with Budi Asyhari Afwan, 2 May 2018.
[64] http://www.suaramuhammadiyah.id/ 2016/ 07/ 06/ bupati-sleman-harapkan-sekolah-muhammadiyah-jadi-favorit-masyarakat/

and subsidies from the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Religious Affairs.[65]

As discussed, approval from the local government is crucial for Muhammadiyah's social welfare and education programs in Sleman. In general, a good relationship will impact the government's contribution to building and developing social welfare institutions, such as schools and hospital facilities.[66] For example, when Muhammadiyah's health division wants to open a new clinic and requires additional doctors, Muhammadiyah needs support from the government. They must ask permission and get approval from the local government. On 12 February 2017, University of Ahmad Dahlan (which is affiliated with Muhammadiyah) launched a new hospital in Ngemplak, Sleman, which could only happen with the approval of the local government. of the district head of Sleman attended the hospital's launch, together with representatives from the Central Board of Muhammadiyah.[67] In addition, the district head of Sleman approved a new facility for heart attacks in Muhammadiyah's hospital in Ambarketawang. During the facility's inauguration, the district head attended with the Central Board of Muhammadiyah and the Governor of Yogyakarta.[68] Similar procedures are practised in the education sector. When one of Muhammadiyah's schools or universities decides to open a new program, it must seek approval from the government.[69]

Increased local government support for social welfare and education programs as a result of Muhammadiyah's political engagement in local elections is proven by the local government's support for innovations in Muhammadiyah schools. For example, the district head of Sleman provided strong support for Muhammadiyah's Vocational High

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[65] Maarif 2012.

[66] Interview with Budi Asyhari Afwan, 2 May 2018.

[67] https://www.radarjogja.co.id/josss-uad-resmikan-rumah-sakit-di-sleman/

[68] http://tribratanews.sleman.jogja.polri.go.id/2017/09/peresmian-instalasi-pelayanan-jantung-terpadu-di-rs-pku-muhammadiyah-ambarketawang-gamping/

[69] Interview with Budi Asyhari Afwan, 2 May 2018.

School, which has successfully developed an environmentally friendly new car. The district head launched this innovation and stated that the school must continue to create new innovations because it will be valuable in building the school's reputation.[70] In addition, he often encouraged Muhammadiyah's schools to hold innovative competitions.[71]

The political engagement of PDM Sleman in local election has also benefited in creating a special network for the local government. Although the district head must provide equal access to all people, he has positioned the organisation as his leading supporter and constituent. Consequently, Muhammadiyah and its members find it easy to invite him to attend Muhammadiyah's activities. In addition, the district head is pleased if Muhammadiyah wants to use local government facilities. For example, when the district head attended the religious study groups (*pengajian*) held by Muhammadiyah in Masjid Agung Sleman, he suggested that Muhammadiyah should use the facilities of Masjid Agung for its *dakwah* efforts.[72] On some occasions, PDM Sleman has even held its programmes at the district head's private residence, such as its Ramadhan *pengajian*, with the district head himself acting as the key preacher.[73]

Muhammadiyah's Engagement in Local Politics and Elections in Bantul

Bantul District has close ties with Yogyakarta as the city where Muhammadiyah was established. Imogiri and Kotagede, which are considered by many people as key parts of 'the city of Muhammadiyah',

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[70] http://www.sembada.id/2018/04/smk-muhammadiyah-pakem-buat-mobil-balap.html

[71] http://www.smpmugadeta.sch.id/berita/gebyar-milad-smp-muhammadiyah-3-depok-ke-36-lomba-roket-air-mugadeta/ and http://www.plazainformasi.jogjaprov.go.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1686&Itemid=53

[72] https://rspkujogja.com/2016/08/09/silaturrahim-akbar-warga-muhammadiyah-sleman-bersama-bupati-dan-ketua-pp-muhammadiyah/

[73] http://www.suaramuhammadiyah.id/2016/07/03/ketua-pdm-sleman-paparkan-enam-kunci-wujudkan-sleman-berkemajuan/

are both located in Bantul. Muhammadiyah's development in Bantul is also advanced, with 20 sub-district boards, 63 village boards, 53 primary schools, 12 junior high schools, and five vocational high schools. This means that this organisation has a good reputation for maintaining its social service institutions.[74]

During the 2005 direct election in Bantul, Idham Samawi elected district head, supported by PDIP.[75] Samawi is a prominent local politician and entrepreneur with close relations to Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, the governor of Yogyakarta. He also has a close relationship with Islamic mass organisations in Yogyakarta, including Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (Indonesia's largest Muslim mass organisation). In 2005, Samawi was supported by a coalition of majority parties in Bantul. His running mate in that election was local bureaucrat Sumarno, who has a strong relationship with Muhammadiyah and was the former leader of the Bantul branch of Muhammadiyah's Student Association In 2005, the candidate pari of Samawi-Sumarno won by gaining 347,214 votes (73 percent of all votes).[76]

Several factors contributed to the 2005 victory of Samawi-Sumarno. One major factor was the support from Islamic mass organisations. At that time, the majority of members of both NU and Muhammadiyah (the largest Islamic mass organisation in Bantul) supported Samawi. NU endorsed Samawi directly by setting up the winning team and facilitating activities that allowed Samawi to campaign effectively. While Muhammadiyah did not give formal support to Samawi, the organisation did offer informal support by instructing Muhammadiyah members to vote for the candidate pair.[77]

In the local election in June 2005, the candidates from PAN and PKB received only a small proportion of votes, despite both parties being

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[74] Rohmaniyati et. al. 2005, p. 41.
[75] Sulistyanto 2009, p. 195.
[76] Sulistiyanto 2009, pp. 195-196; Rohmaniyati et al. 2005, p. 30.
[77] Sulistiyanto 2009, p. 202; Rohmaniyati 2005, pp. 98-99.

affiliated with Muhammadiyah and NU.[78] The political position of Muhammadiyah in Bantul was a significant factor. Although the public perceived PAN to be close to Muhammadiyah, several Muhamaddiyah board members gave informal support to PDIP's Samawi-Sumarno because of Sumarno's status as a Muhammadiyah cadre. Another factor contributing to the loss of candidates from PAN and PKB was that PAN's performance had been declining since the 2004 general election. As noted by Sulistyanto, in Kotagede in 1999, PAN received 37 percent of votes, but by 2004, the vote had collapsed, with other parties such as PKS and Democrats soundly defeating PAN.[79]

PDM Bantul's political position during the 2005 district elections and afterwards was distinct from that of PDM Sleman. On the one hand, PDM Sleman formed the campaign team and fully supported the successful candidate, Sri Purnomo. In contrast, PDM Bantul did not form a campaign team and did not offer official support to certain candidates. Institutionally, Muhammadiyah decided to adopt a neutral stance rather than endorsing the candidate. There was no formal or institutional political engagement by PDM Bantul in either the direct election for the district head or local members of parliament.[80] This decision was based on institutional interest consideration that I will elaborate on the following discussion.

The reason why PDM Bantul did not give formal political support to candidates in 2005 was due to their political ambiguity and dilemma: they were divided whether to prioritise ideological considerations or institutional interests. At that time, two members of Muhammadiyah competed in the Bantul district elections: Sumarno (paired with Samawi), and Riswanto (paired with Totok Sudarto). The former was supported by PDIP, while PAN and PKB supported the latter. Riswanto was a member of

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[78] Sulistiyanto 2006, p. 261.
[79] Sulistiyanto 2006, p. 260-261.
[80] Interview with Drs. H Sahari, General Chairman of the Regional Board of Muhammadiyah Bantul 2015-2020, 30 May 2018.

Muhammadiyah and a former board member of the organisation in the Sewon branch. Meanwhile, Sumarno was also a member, and was well known for his close relationship with the leaders of PDM Bantul. Since there were two candidates from within Muhammadiyah, it triggered a political dilemma for the organisation in deciding its position. This shows that institutional interest is considered more strongly than epistemic or ideological interests. If Muhammadiyah leaders and members emphasized ideological factors, they would have chosen to supported Riswanto-Sudarto, who were supported by Muslim parties PKB and PAN (and were therefore more close in ideology compared to PDIP).

PDM Bantul instead chose to remain politically neutral. Before the 2005 local elections, PDM Bantul's council of politics discussed the political views of its members and analysed the kind of political decision the organisation would take. The council recommended that the organisation take a strategic position and not be directly involved in the local elections. There were three options and recommendations from the council: 1) give support formally to the candidate from PDIP (based on rational choice considerations); 2) form an alliance with Islamic parties and supporting the candidate from PAN and Muhammadiyah (based on epistemic or ideological considerations); or 3) take a neutral position and give political freedom for Muhammadiyah's members (based on institutional interest factors).[81]

Muhammadiyah then decided, based on institutional interest considerations, to choose the third option, so that all member boards of Muhammadiyah would not be allowed to engage directly in local elections. This is because the political choices and closeness of members of PDM Bantul vary. For them, formal political support for the candidate was not strategic and would only disunite Muhammadiyah. Formal political engagement has a negative impact on the organisation's future.[82] PDM Bantul then warned some of its school principals for using their position to

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[81] Rochmaniyati et al. 2005, pp. 65-67.
[82] Rohmaniyati et. al. 2005, p. 43; pp. 66-69.

campaign for certain candidates. The regional board of Muhammadiyah did not allow its chairman and board to attend the campaign team meeting, and issued an organisational decree stating that all its members could not use the organisation's name or facilitates to support candidates.[83]

Even though PDM Bantul's regional board has issued a neutral policy for its members of the board, there were diverse political preferences of its members in Bantul. Some Muhammadiyah members supported the PDIP candidate and formally endorsed him, while others decided to support another candidate. There was also political fragmentation among cadres and boards. For example, two advisors of PDM Bantul came from PAN and PKS, and they competed. This fragmentation influenced Muhammadiyah members at the grassroots level and their wing organisations.[84]

Political fragmentation among Muhammadiyah board members and cadres in Bantul has led to significant changes in the political dynamics. As mentioned earlier, the regional board of PDM Bantul granted its members the freedom to choose and select their own candidate. Then, because each board member had their personal political preference, they would campaign for their preferred candidate to other members. They persuaded many of Muhammadiyah members to stand in the same boat with them. For example, one of the PDM Bantul's advisors carried out political maneuvers to support and campaign for Idham Samawi, as did a general chairman of Muhammadiyah, who had personal links to the PDIP candidate. As a consequence, Muhammadiyah's members at the grassroots level often assumed and interpreted these political maneuvers differently. They thought that Muhammadiyah provided formal support to Samawi, and so followed this decision.[85] Compared to other candidates, therefore Samawi-Sumarno gained more advantages from

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[83] Rohmaniyati et al. 2005, p. 70.
[84] Rohmaniyati et al. 2005, p. 61.
[85] Rohmaniyati et al. 2005, p.71.

Muhammadiyah's neutral position and the political manoeuvring of some of its elites.

Muhammadiyah's decision to take a neutral position in the Bantul local election, based on institutional interests, had two consequences. On one hand, Muhammadiyah was able to keep its neutrality and focus on its social welfare and education programs. Muhammadiyah managed to avoid disunity among its members, and leaders could place politics as an additional agenda after *da'wa* and social service provision. This argument was also supported by the fact that most of Muhammadiyah's social welfare institutions, such as schools and hospitals, are established and developed by Muhammadiyah members.[86] On the other hand, as stated by one figure from PDM Bantul, this neutrality has caused an arduous position for Muhammadiyah in maintaining its socio-political interests, such as accessing social welfare and education programs from the government. The organisation also faced difficulties in promoting its cadres for political positions in bureaucracy. This is because Muhammadiyah had limited bargaining before the winner of the local elections and lacked political access to the centre of power. Hence, Muhammadiyah's cadres could not secure strategic political positions, unlike those in Muhammadiyah.[87]

It is noteworthy that the political dilemma of some board members of PDM Bantul has not affected the organisation's political attractiveness to many candidates. This is because Muhammadiyah has a wide range of networks, which means it has great potential to reach a large number of voters. Although PDM Bantul adopted a neutral position, candidates have employed a range of methods to persuade its cadres. For example, during Samawi's leadership in Bantul District from 1999 to 2010, after which his wife was elected as his successor, candidates actively worked to persuade the major Islamic mass organisations, NU and Muhammadiyah. Samawi regularly visited Islamic leaders, provided donations, and offered other

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[86] Interview with Arif Jamali Muis, 5 May 2018.
[87] Interview with Suwandi Danu Subrata, Vice General Chairman of the Regional Board of Muhammadiyah Bantul, 11 May 2018.

facilities to schools and boarding schools. He even split the district's lucrative education portfolio and shared it between the leaders of NU and Muhammadiyah.[88] Although the policy to split the education council into two was not common, the district head of Bantul considered it to be a political accommodation and strategy to persuade both Islamic organisations.[89]

Rational choice considerations to protect its institutional interests became the primary consideration in PDM Bantul's political decision to not formally support a candidate. If Muhammadiyah supported the candidate from PAN (as the party often associated with Muhammadiyah) and then the candidate lost, it would cause political trouble for Muhammadiyah, including in running its social and political activities.[90] This situation is different from some cases of Muhammadiyah's involvement in local politics. In some regions, Muhammadiyah's political support for the candidate was a strategy to get more access to government programs, as it is essential for social service programs. That is why PDM Bantul's political decision was made in a different context compared to that of PDM Sleman. In Sleman, Muhammadiyah formally supported the strong candidate (who later won the election) as part of the organisation's strategy to ensure its social-based programs ran smoothly. However, although it took a neutral position, PDM Bantul still receives support from the local government.[91]

Institutional interest factor thus encouraged PDM Bantul to take a neutral position in order to maintain the organisation's political ethics and keep a distance from all candidates. PDM Bantul's formal position was neutral, and its members were encouraged to provide informal support to the candidate of their preference.[92] PDM Bantul took this stance because

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[88] Rosser and Sulistyanto 2013, p. 549; Rosser et al. 2011, p. 32.
[89] Supriyanto 2013, p 136.
[90] Interview with Budi Asyhari Afwan, 2 May 2018.
[91] Interview with Budi Asyhari Afwan, 2 May 2018.
[92] Interview with Arief Jamali Muis, 5 May 2018. This statement also was confirmed by Anang Masduki, 6 May 2018.

it calculated the social and political costs of supporting a certain candidate. In a similar vein, the youth organisation of PDM Bantul adopted and promoted a similar political stance. For example, in the 2015 local election, Bantul's Muhammadiyah Youth also issued a political statement about its position. They decided not to be involved directly in campaigns for any candidate.[93] This is interesting, because in other regions, the Muhammadiyah Youth are the most active in insisting Muhammadiyah engage formally in politics, such as in Sleman, where the Muhammadiyah Youth provided all-out support to Sri Purnomo.[94]

The strong presence of Muhammadiyah in Bantul, especially in providing educational services, has benefited the organisation's position vis a vis the government. In this case, the local government needs support from Muhammadiyah. That is why, despite Muhammadiyah's neutral position during local elections, it did not have a profound impact on the organisation's social welfare and education programs. To some extent, during Samawi's leadership, Muhammadiyah's educational programs received numerous benefits from government policies, including the issuance of a policy on universal free basic education. The Bantul district government = implemented this policy by funding a free education scheme, which allows children from low-income families to attend school from primary to high school without paying fees.[95] Muhammadiyah benefited from the politics of universal free basic education because educational institutions in Bantul tend to charge lower fees than schools in Sleman. In Bantul, the majority of Muhammadiyah schools are intended for middle and lower class students. Regarding this policy, one of the heads of Muhammadiyah Bantul stated that under the leadership of Samawi and his wife, all schools of Muhammadiyah performed well.[96]

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[93] http:// pmdiy.or.id/ pernyataan- sikap- pemuda- muhammadiyah- bantul- tentang- pilkada-kabupaten-bantul-2015/
[94] Interview with Anang Masduki, 6 May 2018.
[95] Rosser and Sulistyanto 2013, p. 550.
[96] Rosser and Sulistyanto 2013, pp. 551-552.

Overall, in Yogyakarta, and particularly in Bantul District, Muhammadiyah is a large organisation with a long and good relationship with the government, providing mutual benefits for both parties. Hence, even though Muhammadiyah does not formally engage in politics, their good relationship with the government can be maintained.[97] Whether engaging formally with politics or not, Muhammadiyah has government access. The organisation's social welfare and education programs can run smoothly because their establishment and development does not merely depend on closeness with the government, but more on the creativity and hard work of its regional board. PDM Bantul requires a relationship with the government to run its social welfare and educational institutions, but this partnership is not a primary need, as it complements existing programs.[98] Although it does not engage extensively in politics, PDM Bantul continues to develop and expand its social welfare and educational programs, such as building hospitals, running social services, creating economic institutions for grassroots development, and enhancing the quality of its schools.[99]

One Muhammadiyah leader argues that the social welfare and education institutions owned by Muhammadiyah in most regions, including Bantul, are independent. Muhammadiyah develops its non-profit institutions by collecting contributions from its members and receiving donations from philanthropists. Muhammadiyah sometimes receives contributions from the government, but the value is at most 20 percent of the total operational budget. Nevertheless, even when Muhammadiyah does not receive government funding, its social welfare programs and educational institutions continue.[100]

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[97] Interview with Arif Jamali Muis, 6 May 2018.
[98] Interview with Arif Jamali Muis, 5 May 2018.
[99] http://www.suaramuhammadiyah.id/2016/01/20/pdm-bantul-kembangkan-aum-kesehatan-dan-ekonomi/. See also http:// www.suaramuhammadiyah.id/ 2016/ 03/ 30/ pdm-bantul-semakin-mantap-dalam-membina-umat/
[100] Interview with Budi Asyhari Afwan, 2 May 2018.

However, protecting institutional interests is important because, in many cases, the support of local government is closely tied to operational permits and licenses. For example, Muhammadiyah requires support from local governments on education and health matters in to expand its programs.[101] Therefore, even though Muhammadiyah members do not give formal support to a particular candidate in the local elections, the organisation still needs to gain access permission by lobbying the region's leaders. This can also be achieved by, for example, using formal occasions to invite the district head and vice district head to attend.[102]

Conclusion

This article discusses Muhammadiyah's engagement in local elections in Yogyakarta Province and the factors that shape its involvement. In local politics, Muhammadiyah's interaction with the state and political parties reveals the dynamics of balancing the organisation's political functions with its social welfare programs. This article also reflects Jung's findings on the flexibility of religious organisations in dealing with political parties. It means that Islamic mass organisations' relationships with the state and political parties are not static.[103]

This research demonstrates that institutional interest is the primary consideration for Muhammadiyah leaders in local areas when making political decisions. Even though there is an epistemic influence based on ideological considerations, this factor does not significantly influence leaders and organisational political decisions. The findings highlight that in Sleman, Muhammadiyah's political engagement and contribution to a successful election of a particular candidate benefited the organisation, enabling them to receive support and facilities for social welfare and

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[101] Interview with Arif Jamali Muis, 5 May 2018.
[102] http:// www.umy.ac.id/ umy- dan- bupati- bantul- siap- bekerjasama- majukan- kabupaten-bantul.html
[103] Jung 2014.

education programs. Meanwhile, in Bantul, Muhammadiyah decided to avoid direct engagement with politics and to remain neutral. Here, Muhammadiyah's neutral position benefited the organisation due to its wide-ranging network, and the potential votes were strategically allocated among all candidates.

This research contributes to scholarly discourse of civil society, presenting another variant of civil society in the Muslim world. This research reveals Muhammadiyah as an example of a civil society organisation that can cooperate with the state at the local level. Muhammadiyah therefore differs from many Islamic organisations in the Middle East, which often have disharmonious relations with the state. This research confirms that Muhammadiyah can serve as a civil society and interest group with a strong commitment to acting as an intermediary between the state and society. Rather than positioning itself as an opponent to the state, Muhammadiyah largely works in conjunction with the state as its complement. This research demonstrates another dynamic of the discourse of civil society that can enrich the scholarship of this theme.

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2. Budi Asyhari Afwan, Activist of AMM (Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah) Yogyakarta and a former vice general chairman of Muhammadiyah Youth Yogyakarta, 2 May 2018.
3. Anang Masduki, Vice Secretary of the Provincial Board of Muhammadiyah DI Yogyakarta, 6 May 2018.
4. Agung Wijayanto, a member of the regional board of Muhammadiyah Sleman and Vice Chairman of KNPI Yogyakarta, 7 May 2018
5. Suwandi Danu Subrata, Vice General Chairman of the Regional Board of Muhammadiyah Bantul, 11 May 2018
6. Drs. H. Sahari, General Chairman of the Regional Board of Muhammadiyah Bantul 2015-2020, 30 May 2018.