

Ethnicity and Democracy: Managing Political Complexities in West Papua¹

A Sudiana Sasmita²

Macquarie School of Social Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia

Email: a-sudiana.sasmita@hdr.mq.edu.au

Abstract

This paper aims to reveal the relationship between ethnicity and democracy in the regencies of South Sorong in West Papua Province and Keerom in Papua Province, both situated in Indonesia's easternmost island of Papua. By using Madisonian practice to examine the ethnic party and separatist logics in both regencies, this study explores the presence of cooperation, representation, and accommodation between ethno-religious identities in South Sorong, as well as between Indigenous Papuans (*orang asli Papua*) and the majority Muslim non-Papuan migrants (*pendatang*) in Keerom. The findings of this qualitative study suggest that there is a relationship between ethnicity and democracy that can be used in a positive way for promoting peace and resolving conflict.

Keywords: Ethnicity, democracy, conflict, election, Papua

Introduction

Majority of research on Papua³ has primarily focused on the conflict between the Indonesian government and separatist groups within Papuan society.⁴ The Papuan Independence Organization (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka* or OPM) has actively fought against the state through protests and violent uprisings in pursuit of independence from Indonesia. Scholars from both local and international backgrounds have extensively studied

¹ This paper consists of some materials from my thesis "Ethnicity and Democracy in West Papua: Comparative Analysis of South Sorong and Keerom."

² A. Sudiana Sasmita is Ph.D. Candidate at Macquarie School of Social Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia

³ In this study, the terms 'Papua' and 'West Papua' will be used interchangeably to refer to the provinces of Indonesia on Papua island, which is located in the eastern-most part of Indonesia, sharing the border with Papua New Guinea (PNG). The semantic description has changed from time to time: West New Guinea, Dutch New Guinea, West Papua, West Irian, Irian Jaya, and Papua and Irian Jaya Barat, and from 2007, officially as two provinces: West Papua Province and Papua Province. As of 2022, in addition to West Papua Province and Papua Province, there are four new provinces on the island: South Papua, Mountain Papua, Central Papua, and Southwest Papua.

⁴ Chauvel 2005; Chauvel and Bhakti 2004; Timmer 2008

this topic, paying particular attention to conflict between the state and OPM.⁵ Some scholars have identified that there are four key elements related to the West Papua issue: the historical integration of West Papua into Indonesia, state violence and human rights concerns, the shortcomings of West Papua's development and Special Autonomy implementation, and the marginalization of Indigenous Papuans in accessing public services.⁶

However, the reality is not only about the politics of Papuan nationalism, but also about electoral politics since the implementation of direct elections in 2004.⁷ It is important to note that the situation in West Papua is complex and diverse, with multiple stakeholders and interests involved. While many studies concentrate on the conflict between the Indonesian government and the West Papuan nationalist movement, it is also crucial to consider alternative perspectives. These may include the reality that some Indigenous Papuans (*orang asli Papua*) who support integration with Indonesia, while others advocate for increased autonomy within the Indonesian state. Gaining a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the situation requires acknowledging the various viewpoints and experiences of different communities.⁸

This study emphasizes the intricate political landscape of Papua, characterized by both Papuan nationalism and electoral politics.⁹ While electoral politics are an integral part of democracy in Indonesia, Indigenous Papuans face a lack of democratic freedom, as they are excluded from the Indonesian democratic standards.¹⁰ One of the main reasons for this is due the demand for separation from Indonesia. There is no freedom of expression in Papua and military oppression is widespread. This exclusion has resulted in the marginalization of Indigenous Papuans in electoral politics, with their numbers dwindling in several regencies. Additionally, the emphasis on electoral politics has diverted attention from the ongoing conflict between the Indonesian government and the West Papuan nationalist movement, driven by issues such as state violence, human rights abuses, and marginalization.¹¹ Scholars have argued that since the 2019 Indonesian presidential election, there has been a decline and regression of Indonesian democracy, including in West Papua.¹² Moreover, other scholars note the lack of political representation for Indigenous Papuans, with non-Papuans occupying seats in local parliaments, leading to "electoral politics marginalization" since Papuans have become a minority in several regencies, including Sorong, Manokwari, Merauke, Timika, Jayapura, and Keerom.¹³ Thus, it is crucial to consider both the politics of Papuan nationalism and electoral politics in West Papua. The politics of nationalism and electoral politics may occur at the same time. In elections, for example, political leaders or legislators gain supporters despite being for or

⁵ Elmslie 2001; King 2004 & 2006; Ondawame 2000; Tebay 2005

⁶ Rusdiarti and Pamungkas 2017; Widjojo 2009

⁷ Chauvel 2010 & 2021

⁸ Timmer 2008

⁹ Chauvel 2010

¹⁰ Aspinall 2011; Hefner 2005; van Klinken 2009 and 2019

¹¹ Aspinall 2011; Chauvel 2021

¹² Power and Waverton 2020

¹³ Chauvel 2021, 286-287

against Papuan independence (“*Papua merdeka*”). They use ethnicity for mobilizing supporters to win the election from their own group and other ethnic groups.

This study utilizes three logics—the Madisonian, ethnic party, and separatist logics — as mechanisms to explore these two realities, examining the dynamics of the relationship between ethnicity and democracy.¹⁴ The aim is to challenge the assumption that ethnicity inherently undermines democracy and instead examine how local democracy and ethnicity intersect. In this paper, I explore two cases (the regencies of South Sorong and Keerom) to show how these logics work in practice and what they mean regarding complexities of ethnic identities based on languages, religions, and regions in the land of Papua.

Theoretical Framework: Ethnicity and Democracy

Only a limited number of studies have addressed the interplay between ethnicity and democracy in Papua, usually through the examination of Special Autonomy (*Otonomi Khusus*), *pemekaran* (the creation of new administrative regions), and local elections.¹⁵ The ethnic politics manifest in South Sorong regard three aspects: through the bureaucracy, which accommodate representations from all ethnic groups; through formal politics, where informal connections with political parties are maintained; and through civil society, which allocates funds to social organizations and groups.¹⁶ Additionally, *pemekaran* is intertwined with local elections, particularly in West Papua, as *pemekaran* often arises when candidates who lost in local contests demand the creation of new administrative regions in order to become regional heads of these newly formed areas. *Pemekaran* provides opportunities for local elites in West Papua to gain power by mobilizing their ethnic groups during elections.¹⁷ Some researchers predict that the division of new regencies through *pemekaran* can lead to serious issues, such as development gaps between the old and new administrative areas, resulting in the migration of non-Papuan migrants to the newly formed regions.¹⁸ Notably, the majority of migrants to Papua are Muslim, which has created tensions and conflict, as the majority of Indigenous Papuans are Christian (Catholic or Protestant). Ethnicity has thus become a problem for conflict and democracy in this region.

I argue that the problem lies in the assumption that ethnicity solely adheres to ‘primordial’ propositions that ethnic identity is fixed and singular. The Papuan conflict has been characterized in terms of horizontal and vertical conflicts; the former involves clashes between ethnic or clan groups, while the latter pertains to the tension between the Indonesian state and West Papuan society, particularly OPM. Using these terms, ethnic conflict, rooted in primordialism and secessionism, becomes a justification for categorizing West Papua's democracy as being in a precarious state. There are scholars and activists who even argue that there is no democracy in West Papua.¹⁹ This notion of ‘primordialism’

¹⁴ Selway, 2015

¹⁵ Haryanto, Sukmajati, and Lay 2019; Suryawan 2015

¹⁶ Haryanto 2017

¹⁷ Suryawan 2015

¹⁸ Widjojo 2009; Chauvel 2021

¹⁹ Ondawame 2000; King 2004

may explain why studies on local elections and Special Autonomy in West Papua face challenges in determining whether these processes alleviate or exacerbate separatist movements.²⁰ Nonetheless, significant changes have occurred in the new regencies and provinces in the land of Papua, including administrative and political expressions, demographic shifts, and settlement patterns.²¹ This paper observed the political changes in the cases of South Sorong and Keerom, which are the focus of this study.

To analyze both regencies, we need to acknowledge two frameworks for understanding Indonesian politics, the 'oligarchy' and 'non-oligarchy' frameworks.²² First, the oligarchy framework can be seen in studies which present evidence of stagnation and regression in Indonesian democracy,²³ with Papua being one of the worst cases. The oligarchy framework suggests that the Indonesian political structure is inherently undemocratic, as power and decision-making remain concentrated in the hands of select political and business elites.²⁴ In West Papua, this framework is reflected in the presence of 'little Suhartos' as governors and district heads who possess political power and decision-making authority.²⁵ In this way, they lead the regions as President Suharto controlled Indonesia from 1966 to 1998. This supports Hadiz's proposition that Indonesian democratic liberalism has reinforced the consolidation of an illiberal form of democracy in Indonesia, perpetuating old oligarchic practices.²⁶

The non-oligarchy framework, on the other hand, focuses on political elites engaging in the circulation or rotation of power, where leadership succession occurs transparently, indicating the presence of a democratic system. Conversely, closed succession indicates a non-democratic system.²⁷ The non-oligarchy framework argues that Indonesia's democratization may lie in the hands of local elites with social and political roots, rather than a group of oligarchs within an isolated upper class monopolizing power.²⁸ During the post-Suharto Reformasi era, research studies began to emphasize the role of civil society in political participation and representation within local political regimes.²⁹ Prior to this, scholars had revealed the vulnerabilities of the New Order regime, marked by persistent tensions between political elites surrounding Soeharto and issues related to the distribution of economic policies that favored Java-centric interests.³⁰ The New Order era in 1990s provided an opportunity for civil society to grow and develop, serving as a bridge between the community and the state.

In this study, I approach ethnicity as constructivist with the non-oligarchy framework. By doing so, we can open our understanding regarding similarities between of local Papuan political system and other Melanesian political systems, which are

²⁰ Mietzner 2007

²¹ Chauvel 2021

²² Bourchier and Hadiz 2014; Kusuma 2022; Winters 2014

²³ Power and Warburton 2020

²⁴ Hadiz 2004

²⁵ Timmer 2007

²⁶ Hadiz 2017

²⁷ Haryanto 2020

²⁸ Nordholt 2015; van Klinken 2009 and 2019

²⁹ Savirani and Törnquist 2015

³⁰ Liddle 1992

characterized by persistent democratic elements, as observed in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. This paper is in-line with Firth's argument that West Papua's political system exhibits similar traits: "Melanesian political systems are better understood in their own terms and in a way that incorporates the cultural setting in which they are embedded. Concepts such as clientelism and neo-patrimonialism are misleading in Melanesian political systems. They are typified by a lack of party discipline and ideology ('unbounded politics'), a reliance on democratic elections as a source of legitimacy ('democratic persistence'), strong and loyalties to kinship ties ('primacy of kin obligations'), and the limited effectiveness of the government in general ('the limited state'). Meanwhile, law and justice are delivered at the local level through customary practices, religious institutions, and state mechanisms".³¹

Constructivist Theories: Ethnic Politics and Democracy

This study aims to analyze ethnicity and democracy in West Papua using constructivist theories. As a constructivist, I approach ethnicity as a collective identity, consisting of "ethnic structure" and "ethnic practice".³² The division of the two aspects is important because ethnic identity can change depending on the context, leading to multiple identities for individuals. For example, an individual's ethnic identity may vary when they function as an individual versus when they engage in public electoral politics. These ethnic identities undergo changes and are activated for political purposes, involving the use of ethnicity (ethnic structure and ethnic practice) to seek and maintain power as leaders and legislators in South Sorong and Keerom.³³

To compare South Sorong and Keerom, I use the term 'setting' referring to the context in which ethnic politics unfolds. The settings include electoral politics, bureaucracy, and society. First, electoral politics is an essential setting for exploring the behavior of voters, political parties, and political. Chauvel emphasizes that local politics in Papua is an open and highly competitive arena.³⁴ Ethnic competition occurs among Indigenous Papuans belonging to different ethnic groups based on language, clan, religion, and territory. This competition also extends to the Indigenous Papuan identities versus non-Papuans, often referred to as *pendatang* (migrants who have settled in West Papua). The *pendatang* are mostly Muslim from other islands, while Indigenous Papuans are mostly non-Muslim.

Second, bureaucracy is one of the non-electoral politics settings, although bureaucratic activities can be closely related to electoral politics.³⁵ I will analyze the behavior of the bureaucracy and its interaction with political actors governing South Sorong and Keerom. While the law formally prohibits bureaucrats from supporting specific candidates and actively participating in political campaigns, in practice, bureaucratic positions are often influenced by political considerations arising from local elections.³⁶ This

³¹ Firth 2019, 96

³² Chandra 2012

³³ Chandra 2012; Chandra and Wilkinson 2008

³⁴ Chauvel 2021

³⁵ Chandra 2012

³⁶ Purwoko 2016

can be observed through the phenomenon of nearly all government agency heads supporting a particular candidate. Additionally, the recruitment and placement of bureaucrats sometimes lead to violent upheavals in society, such as the burning of government offices, when dissatisfaction arises over the recruitment of civil servants, particularly the perceived underrepresentation of Indigenous Papuans compared to non-Papuans.³⁷

The third setting is society as non-institutionalized politics, including violence and protests. In this setting, mass organizations and networks such as *paguyuban*, *ikatan*, or *kerukunan* in South Sorong and Keerom are examined. Although scholars use the term 'civil militia' to describe these organizations that emerged in Indonesia after the fall of Suharto's New Order regime in 1998, arguing that they undermine democracy in the country.³⁸ The term 'civil militia' is used due to the militaristic attributes and the use of violence by these community organizations to gain formal and informal power. Mass organizations persist today because they bridge the formal and the informal aspects of politics in Indonesia. For example, they help mobilize grass-root support for politicians to gain public office and in return the politicians provide them protection and economic opportunities.

By using constructivist theories, this study aims to shed light on the dynamics of ethnicity and democracy in South Sorong and Keerom regarding three settings: electoral politics, bureaucracy, and society. The comparison between South Sorong and Keerom is important because South Sorong politics dominated by Indigenous Papuan from different tribes (*suku*) while in Keerom, the local politics dominated by non-Papuans who lived at Keerom through the transmigration program (state-sponsored migration) since 1980s.

The Link Between Ethnicity and Democracy: The Mechanism

One of the ways to explore the relationship between ethnicity and democracy is: by using the 'mechanism' theory. This can be done through constructing the linkage between ethnicity and democracy. Three logics can help link between ethnicity and democracy: Madisonian logic, ethnic party logic, and separatist logic.³⁹ These logics are mechanisms that connect ethnicity and democracy.

1) Madisonian Logic: Cooperation and Moderation

Madisonian logic connects ethnicity with the concepts of cooperation and moderation by thinking that ethnic diversity leads to the necessity of cooperation.⁴⁰ In this logic, the ethnic diversity of West Papua – based on clans, languages, and territories – leads to the necessity of cooperation between ethnic groups. The answer to why more diversity is better for democracy lies in the necessity for cooperation in multi-ethnic entities, widely regarded as one of the elements of democracy. This cooperation is based on "the logic of greater dispersion of interest and values in highly fractionalized societies, making it harder

³⁷ Widjojo 2009; Chauvel 2021

³⁸ McDonald and Wilson 2017

³⁹ Selway 2015

⁴⁰ Selway 2015; Steven Fish and Kroenig 2006, 839.

for an authoritarian ruler to cut opposition and easier for opposition leaders to find potential bases of support".⁴¹

This study would analyze South Sorong and Keerom by showing ethnic diversity based on clan, language (dialect), religion, territorial, and community groups. This diversity is crosscutting in everyday lives of people in West Papua, leading to cooperation in each setting. While some scholars argue that diversity deepens conflicts that often occur in West Papua, Madisonian logic suggests that political strife is calmed by the polity embracing multiple lines of cleavage and conflicts. The potential for cooperation between ethnic groups can be analyzed as cleavages crosscut or reinforce each other to consolidate democracy.⁴²

2) Ethnic Party Logic: Representation

Ethnic party logic is that political representation based on ethnic identities would induce democracy. This logic is related to the Madisonian logic that multi-party systems in multi-ethnic societies tend to "consolidate better, broadening and moderating their policy to increase the chance of electoral victory".⁴³ At the same time, other scholars may disagree that this logic can translate ethnic division into political conflict.⁴⁴ In West Papua, this disagreement can be seen in the controversy surrounding local political parties, of which the central government rejected the establishment because they argued that people could use the local parties to pursue separatism. However, West Papuans argue that local parties are part of the Special Autonomy Law that guarantees the political representation of Indigenous Papuans. I argue that ethnic party logic can be present in political parties at the local level, which is more based on political figures than ideologies, programs, and political agendas. The governors and district heads who win local elections in West Papua more often come from small political parties than large parties in Indonesia, such as Golkar and PDI-P. Interestingly, in the 2004 general election, when it was proposed that Golkar disband due to its unpopularity because of the legacy of the New Order, voter turnout for Golkar in West Papua was the highest compared to other regions. This result is because voters in West Papua tend to vote for candidates based on the candidates themselves instead of the political party.

The phenomenon of a political party resembling an 'ethnic party' seems typical in the Melanesian political system, but this encourages political representation to be more visible. The relationship between voters and political parties is shown by how well a political actor represents voters in the government, parliament, and bureaucracy, which is difficult to neutralize in performing their duties. The political representation requires Indigenous Papuan candidates to become leaders and legislators in West Papua. In the case of Aceh, where the Special Autonomy Law also applies, the existence of local political parties increased the participation of people in the local and national elections and transformed the former rebels into rulers and legislators with influence in the political

⁴¹ Selway 2015, 152

⁴² Selway 2015, 152-153

⁴³ Selway 2015, 156

⁴⁴ Wilkes and Wu 2018

system.⁴⁵ Although the role of political parties may not be well-institutionalized, they have stable support from the grassroots since voters tend to follow their candidates, who can and often do change membership from one party to another. This logic also helps us understand how candidates or politicians use ethnic identities to win an election that needs popular support from their ethnic groups.

3) Separatist Logic: Accommodation

Separatist logic means by threatening the Indonesian state and local government with the formation of a separatist group, an ethnic group will have their interests accommodated. This logic can work in some situations, as the state would do anything to maintain their territory from disintegration, including through military operations and accommodative policy. In the experience of Indonesian democracy, we can see the how military operations stopped secession in East Timor for several decades, while accommodative policy worked to solve the armed conflict in Aceh.⁴⁶ In West Papua, there is a dynamic policy from the Indonesian central government, using both military and accommodative approaches. However, scholars still argue against implementing a military or security approach rather than an accommodative policy.⁴⁷

Accommodation is a form of democratic policy when the state faces the challenge of separatism. For Papuans, this accommodation is part of the opportunity to pursue their interests between independence from Indonesia and remaining part of Indonesia. It is difficult to distinguish between demands for secession and true independence (*merdeka*) and for more accommodative policies, since we must assume that Papuans know how to play the system.⁴⁸ This separatist logic can connect the demand for independence with the democratic process in Papua. It is important to note that accommodation policies may not necessarily be a permanent solution to the separatist conflict, as it is a complex issue with historical, cultural, and political roots, and accommodation policies may not address the underlying issues that fuel separatist sentiments. Furthermore, the extent to which democratization can extinguish the desire for independence remains to be seen, as the conflict is deeply entrenched and complex. It is essential to approach the issue with an open mind and consider multiple perspectives and solutions to achieve a peaceful resolution.

Results and Discussion: The Settings, Logics, and Practices

In this paper, ethnicity and democracy can be analyzed in three settings: electoral politics, bureaucracy, and society. The relationship between ethnicity and democracy can be examined through three types of logic: Madisonian, ethnic party, and separatist. Madisonian logic shows that diversity necessitates cooperation and moderation of groups; ethnic party logic is the political representation based on ethnicity; and separatist logic sees

⁴⁵ Hilman 2012; Stange and Patock 2010

⁴⁶ Chauvel and Bhakti 2004; Singh 2008

⁴⁷ Chauvel and Bhakti 2004; McGibbon 2004; Musa'ad 2012

⁴⁸ Timmer 2007

separation as a way for ethnic groups demanding for accommodation from the state and the local government.

Table 1. Logic and Settings of Local Democracy in South Sorong and Keerom

Logic and Settings	Madisonian Logic	Ethnic Party Logic	Separatist Logic
South Sorong	Society	Electoral and bureaucracy	Society
Keerom	Society	Electoral politics	Bureaucracy and society

Madisonian Logic: Diversity and Cooperation

Madisonian logic can be seen in the setting of society in South Sorong and Keerom, where diversity based on language, religion (Muslim and non-Muslim), and territory (village and subdistrict [*distrik*]), creates a need for cooperation and moderation between ethnic identities. This cooperation happens because the different interests and values create diversity in society and make it more difficult for those in power to dismiss other groups based on their support basis. This does not mean that tensions and conflicts are completely non-existent. Clashes due to disappointment over the outcome of regional elections may also result in bigger violence. However, the people have a mechanism to defend themselves and not amplify the conflicts with the existence of organizations or associations that alleviate and moderate the situation. In Papua, these are namely the Lembaga Masyarakat Adat (LMA or Customary Community Council), *Dewan Adat Suku* (DAS or Customary Tribal Council), and *paguyuban/kerukunan* (associations) that are open to members from different sub-groups or ethnic groups. This openness is based on the cross-relationships between ethnic groups, social interactions, religions, and mutual relationships.

South Sorong: Local Papuan Ethnic Groups

The majority of population in South Sorong is Indigenous Papuan, including several different ethnic groups such as Tehit, Imekko, and Maybrat. This ethnic diversity requires residents to cooperate and exercise moderation in everyday life. While the different ethnic groups compete in electoral politics, they cooperate well in social and economic activities since they need to do so to coexist peacefully. Many of the ethnic groups in South Sorong have established ethnicity-based organizations or associations to promote the interests of their ethnic group, assisting communication processes between different ethnic groups in the regency.

In South Sorong, we find organizations such as Binasket Tehit; LMA and DAS for Tehit people; DAS for Imekko people; and DAS for Maybrat people. In addition, there are *paguyuban* and *kerukunan* for non-Papuans who live in South Sorong. As mass social organizations (*ormas*), they receive funding from the local government of around IDR 50

million per year, as well as donations from members at least once a month during gatherings. The organizations collect donations for social causes and their own programs.⁴⁹

Firstly, let us look at Binasket Tehit. 'Binasket' is an abbreviation of *Pembinaan Keluarga Besar Suku Tehit di Tanah Papua* (Organization for Leading the Tehit People in the Land of Papua). The organization was formally established in 1975 by several bureaucrats and college students in Jayapura, Papua's largest city. It was triggered by an incident at a forestry company, in which one of the dead was from Teminabuan, South Sorong. The forestry company avoided paying compensation and returning the body to Teminabuan. Locals gathered several times and initiated the organization to assist people from their region, particularly from Greater Sorong, in Jayapura. Binasket Tehit does not only facilitate social activities for the Tehit people, but also supports members' political and economic activities. However, Binasket is not a *lembaga adat* (customary institution) of the Tehit people. Instead, they claim to be a social organization covering the sub-groups living in Teminabuan and neighboring territories. As Binasket did not particularly belong to a certain clan, it became an organization for the Tehit people. Therefore, we can see the existence of this Binasket organization as a facilitator of ethnic groups, not just certain clans, to cooperate with each other for the common good.

Other ethnic group organizations in South Sorong are LMA and DAS. The number of each of these organizations is equal to the number of ethnic groups in the regency: Tehit, Imekko, and Maybrat. LMA and DAS reflect the diversity of ethnic groups in South Sorong: there are LMA Tehit (Customary Community Council of Tehit), DAS Tehit (Tehit Customary Tribal Council), LMA Imekko (Customary Community Council of Imekko), DAS Imekko (Imekko Customary Tribal Council), and LMA Maybrat (Customary Community Council of Maybrat). These represent the larger ethnic groups, which is a grouping of people based on sub-groups, clans (*kereth*), villages, subdistricts, and regions. The structure of LMA and DAS consists of customary figures and heads of sub-groups from the same territory. The chair of DAS Tehit explained that the LMA and DAS do not have any substantial differences; both have the function to facilitate the existence of the tribes and unite Indigenous Papuan tribes. The difference is that the LMA have AD/ART (statutes/bylaws), which are self-made by members and are endorsed by the local government, while DAS do not have AD/ART but use unwritten customary laws and are facilitated and formed by the local government to involve the communities in decision making and formally recognize *adat* (customary) rights.

Binasket, LMA dan DAS maintain their relationships with non-Papuans who organize themselves in associations such as *paguyuban*, *ikatan* or *kerukunan*. In South Sorong, there are Javanese *Paguyuban*, *Ikatan Keluarga Manado* (IKM or Manado Family Association), *Ikatan Keluarga Toraja* (IKT or Toraja Family Association), and *Kerukunan Keluarga Sulawesi Selatan* (KKSS or South Sulawesi Family Association). The role of KKSS can be seen in the ethnic conflicts between Bugis, Buton, and Makassar (BBM) people from South Sulawesi with other ethnic groups in Papua. For instance, in 2005, during a conflict between the Bugis people and Indigenous Papuans from Biak living in Sorong, the KKSS tried to resolve an incident where a Bugis ojek (motor taxi) driver had killed Indigenous

⁴⁹ Interview with Hanggi, March 9, 2019

Papuans from Biak in two separate places. The families of the victims sought revenge by gathering all Papuans in the city to kill non-Papuans, particularly targeting Bugis people. The local government and police tried to resolve the conflict, but the Papuans from Biak were adamant on obtaining revenge. They said that if they did not get an eye for an eye, the Bugis people must pay IDR 20 billion to the families of the victims as a customary fine (*denda adat*). The Bugis people did not have the money and tried to negotiate the size of the fine, and after several negotiations, the families of the victims agreed to accept around IDR two billion while the man who killed the victims was prosecuted and was sentenced to jail.⁵⁰

Meanwhile, *Paguyuban* Lestari Jaya was founded as an organization for all Javanese people in 1975. In the beginning, the name was Lestari Java, but the organization changed the word Java to Jaya because members of the *paguyuban* are not only Javanese. For instance, the spouses of members who are not from Java can also be part of the *paguyuban*. The main function of the *paguyuban* is for social activities such as gatherings, helping members in need, and donating money to social causes.⁵¹

Keerom: Indigenous and Non-Papuan Groups

In Keerom, there is a DAS and an LMA of Keerom as well as *paguyuban* and *kerukunan* which play the role of maintaining social cooperation in society. In Keerom, the role of Dewan Adat Keerom (DAK, or Keerom Customary Tribal Council) is more influential than LMA Keerom. Particularly, DAK has an influential role in demanding political representation as the deputy district head of Keerom, in order to balance power between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Papuans. The previous district head regent passed away and was replaced by the then-deputy district head in 2018, but because the new district head is non-Papuan, DAK demanded that the new deputy district head be an Indigenous Keerom person.

The role of DAK has become massive since the regent is a non-Indigenous Papuan in Keerom from 2018 to 2020. DAK demanded that the new deputy district head must be an Indigenous Keerom for the 2020 regional elections. The then-district head intended to remain in the power and planned to run again in 2020. This created controversy since two political parties (PKS and Golkar), which had the right to propose the new deputy district head under the regional elections law, offered different candidates instead. DAK put forward their own candidate for deputy district head and claimed that they had a recommendation from Golkar, but PKS refused to recommend DAK's candidate because they had their own candidate for deputy district head. In response, DAK then blockaded the local government office for a week and held several demonstrations demanding their Indigenous Keerom candidate to be the new deputy district head, even though the candidate was the political competitor of the then-district head. The DAK candidate became the new deputy district head after the candidate was elected by Keerom district councilors. After 17 months, the new deputy district head of Keerom was inaugurated by the Governor of Papua Province on July 30, 2019, after DAK and their candidate negotiated

⁵⁰ Interview with Maridho, adviser of KKSS, March 1, 2019

⁵¹ Interview with Sandi, adviser of Lestari Jaya, March 5, 2019

with the *paguyuban/kerukunan* in Keerom regarding the selection of deputy district head.⁵² A month later, the deputy district head inaugurated the chairman and organizing committees of DAK as the representatives of adat (customs) in Keerom not only for indigenous Keerom but also for other ethnic groups living in Keerom.⁵³

Paguyuban or *kerukunan* is a term that refers to formal and informal social organizations across Indonesia, including in Keerom, where members are almost exclusively non-Indigenous Papuans. The organizations can be formal or informal based on the need of the members and scope of operations. As an informal organization, members of *paguyuban* use the association for gatherings and participating in events and ceremonies, such as funerals, wedding parties, and traditional ceremonies. In Keerom, the *paguyuban* is a group that bonds non-Papuans who migrated from the same region (such as Java) as newcomers to Keerom regency. As a formal organization, meanwhile, the *paguyuban*, *ikatan* or *kerukunan* is required to obtain permission from the government. If they do, they are registered as a social organization and can collect money for the organization's fund to organize meetings, hold social gatherings, and provide donations to the members of *paguyuban* and other people. Most non-Papuans who live in Keerom join a formal or informal *paguyuban*, *ikatan* or *kerukunan*. Some *paguyuban* are non-active due to changes of the organizing committees, but many have existed for a long time in Keerom, such as the Paguyuban of Sunda Ngumbara from West Java, which is the longest active organization in Keerom.⁵⁴ Other associations include those representing South Sulawesi (*Kerukunan Keluarga Sulawesi Selatan* or KKSS), Lombok (*Ikatan Keluarga Lombok* or IKL), Batak people (*Ikatan Keluarga Batak* or IKB), Maluku (*Ikatan Keluarga Maluku* or IKELAM), North Maluku (*Ikatan Keluarga Maluku Utara*), several towns in Central and East Java (*Paguyuban Kebumen*, *Paguyuban Kediri*, and *Paguyuban Pati*), and Minahasa people (*Kerukunan Keluarga Kawanua* or K3).

Every non-Papuan who becomes a member of their *paguyuban* does so for their own reasons, ranging from economic to political interests. One informant mentioned that his reason to join his *paguyuban* was learning how to organize the community and, in the end, he used it for political purposes to be a member of regional legislative council, noting that regeneration in the *paguyuban* is ongoing, just as he was recruited when he was a young man to be the secretary of the *paguyuban* committees in his village.⁵⁵ This organization successfully connects people for cooperation between different ethnic groups.

Ethnic Party Logic: Political Representation

Ethnic party logic occurs in electoral politics of both South Sorong and Keerom; it also can be seen in bureaucracy of South Sorong. This is because political representation is determined more by ethnic groups than political parties. The role of ethnic groups seems to have replaced that of political parties in mobilizing support for candidates in local and

⁵² <https://www.jubi.co.id/bupati-keerom-diminta-tak-persulit-pelantikan-wakil-bupati/>

⁵³ See also the news about the inauguration of DAK at <https://dialogpublik.com/pengukuhan-dewan-adat-kab-keerom-papua-pada-tahun-2019/>

⁵⁴ Interview with Raden, February 16, 2019

⁵⁵ Interview with Marto, February 21, 2019

regional leader and legislative (DPRD) elections. There are common perceptions that ethnic groups becoming engaged in politics will lead to segregation and disintegration, yet preventing them from going into politics is not a sufficient solution. Some studies of Indonesian politics reveal that ethnicity is a big source of capital for democratization in Indonesia, as well as a challenge in dealing with the diverse political representations.⁵⁶ The political representation of Indigenous Papuan is indeed an important element as a part of the Indonesian political system. It does not necessarily negate the representation of other groups that still face challenges due to the difficulties faced by grassroots candidates to enter and influence the political system, but having Indigenous Papuans represented as leaders and legislators is nonetheless needed to connect the grassroots and the state. Moreover, the reciprocal linkage between political actors and the grassroots may serve as a starting point for the demands and aspirations of the public to be better manifested in public policies, including changes in the state's approach toward the communities.

South Sorong: Electoral and Bureaucratic Settings

In South Sorong, political representation is based on ethnic groups. Ethnic groups often play a role as members of a political candidate's *'tim sukses'* ('success team') in elections. They mobilize voters from their own ethnic group and often manage to develop a head and district head candidate pair by coordinating with another different ethnic group, because they cannot win only with the votes from their own ethnic group. In the 2020 South Sorong election, the candidate pairs for district head and deputy district head were all mixed ethnicities, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2. District Head-Deputy District Head and Ethnic Group in South Sorong, 2020

District Head-Deputy District Head Candidate Pair	Ethnic Group	Total Vote (percentage)
Samsudin Anggiluli – Alfons Sesa	Imekko – Tehit	20,009 (52%)
Yunus Saflembolo – Alexander Dedaida	Tehit – Imekko	2,183 (6%)
Yance Salambauw – Feliks Duwit	Tehit – Maybrat	12,742 (33%)
Pieter Kondjol – Madun Narwawan	Tehit – Bugis (non-Papuan)	3,374 (9%)

Source: KPUD of South Sorong, 2020

Overall, Samsudin Anggiluli – Alfons Sesa won the most votes in the 2020 election with victories in three ethnic group territories: Imekko, Tehit, and Maybrat. Table 2 shows that the ethnic combinations of candidates in a pair can be said to affect the number of votes gained. We can see that the biggest difference in votes between the winning pair and the second-place winner (Yance Salambauw – Feliks Duwit) came from the Imekko area, where Samsudin Anggiluli is originally from. In the Imekko area, Samsudin Anggiluli – Alfons Sesa received almost three times the votes for the candidate pair Yance Salambauw – Felix Duwit (3,766). The difference was not so significant in the Tehit area, where Yance Salambauw – Felix Duwit received 7,569 votes, with a difference of 1,300 votes between

⁵⁶ Berenschot and Aspinall 2020

them and Samsudin Anggiluli - Alfons Sesa. Alfons Sesa as a candidate for deputy district head was also Tehit.

After winning the election, *tim sukses* (success team) consolidates themselves with the elected candidates to run the local government, especially in the bureaucracy. I obtained information on the meetings between candidates and their success teams from local elections in 2010, 2015, and 2020. The meetings discussed the most awaited campaign promises: the official positions in bureaucracy and the planned development projects. Bureaucratic politicization is common in South Sorong, and it prevents bureaucracy from being a neutral space of ethnic groups. The politicization begins with recruitment, including the placement of heads of government offices/agencies, and the transfer of bureaucratic positions. This politicization occurs due to rivalry between ethnic groups to take control of state resources. However, the use of bureaucratic apparatus is conducted under the radar because the law forbids civil servants from becoming involved in practical politics. They must be neutral and independent in their functions and duties as civil servants. On the surface, however, it is obvious in how government facilities and development projects for the village communities are used by the district head and/or deputy district head.

Operationally, the principle of ethnic representation presents itself in how each ethnic group holds a share of structural office positions in the regency's bureaucracy. Efforts taken to fill these positions can be seen in the period of the District Head Otto Ihalauw to the present period of Samsudin Anggiluli. Otto Ihalauw distributed representatives of ethnic groups in South Sorong in Echelon II (*Eselon II*) positions across his regency government (Haryanto, 2015). Bureaucratic representatives from Tehit seemed to be dominant; this also explains the tendency of Otto Ihalauw to represent himself as Tehit. During the period of Samsudin Anggiluli, who is Imekko, the number of representatives from this group holding the echelon II position is higher than other ethnic groups. As mentioned by Yudi, a senior bureaucrat in South Sorong, ethnic consideration is a fundamental aspect in having a structural position in bureaucracy, as implemented by Samsudin Anggiluli.⁵⁷ Even in 2015, Samsudin replaced all heads of government agencies without the six-month waiting period required by the staff rules. Officials in the bureaucracy were dismissed and replaced with bureaucrats who supported Samsudin. However, the echelon III (*Eselon III*) structural positions were given to other groups to ensure that each group was represented. At the same time, these bureaucratic representations maintain the stability of the governments implemented by the district head, including the officials in the bureaucracy who hold influence among their respective ethnic groups and hence manage to prevent conflicts at the grassroots level.

Ethnic politics in bureaucracies are not merely based on considerations of primordial loyalty. This explains why several heads of subdistricts in Papua are accepted by the community despite being from a different ethnic group. Their acceptance is not solely due to their competence as subdistrict head, but also their ability to identify themselves as part of the ethnic group in the subdistrict they lead, including in accommodating people from the majority ethnic group to hold public positions that represent their social group. In

⁵⁷ Interview with Yudi, March 11, 2019

other words, the constructivist dimension is a present component in understanding the non-singular ethnic identities. The construction of identity of an ethnic group that was not satisfied with the appointment of a certain official, and went on a rally to demand the district head to appoint a person from their ethnic group to fill a certain position, cannot be viewed only from the surface. This does not only show that each ethnic group has aspirations and interests to have their members hold bureaucratic positions as representatives of the group, but also presents ethnic representation as the fundamental component in allowing the mobilization of support from the ethnic groups.

Keerom: Electoral Politics

Meanwhile, in Keerom, ethnic party logic occurs in electoral politics between Indigenous Papuans and non-Papuans. This comparison is to show that local politics in Papua is not only about competition between Indigenous Papuans, such as in South Sorong, but also between Indigenous Papuans and non-Papuans. The district head and deputy district head, along with ethnic groups and results, are shown in Table 3.

Table 3. District Head-Deputy District Head with Ethnic Group in the 2020 Keerom Election

District Head and Deputy District Head Candidates	Ethnic Group	Total Votes (Percentage)
Piter Gusbager – Wahfir Kosasih	Indigenous Papuan – non-Papuan	22,075 (48%)
Muhammad Markum – Malensius Musui	Non-Papuan – Indigenous Papuan	13,397 (30%)
Yusuf Wally – Hadi Susilo	Indigenous Papuan – non-Papuan	10,080 (22%)

Source: KPUD of Keerom, 2020

The politics of ethnicity has become a determining factor in local politics in Keerom. This is indicated by the candidacy of Muhammad Markum as district head, who became a candidate because no regulation requires the positions of district head and/or deputy district head to be held by Indigenous Papuans. This requirement only applies to the positions of governor and deputy governor (at the provincial level) Papua in accordance with the Special Autonomy Law. Markum took advantage of this to become district head in Keerom by gathering political parties to contest the 2020 election. He managed to bring almost all political parties in Keerom to support his candidacy, including PKS (who won the 2019 legislative election in Keerom), Hanura, PPP, Perindo, Garuda, Demokrat, and Gerindra. PKS had won the legislative election in 2019 because the majority of population in Keerom is non-Papuan and Islam since the transmigration program, and Markum exploited this fact in his attempt to win the 2020 district head election. His strategy was different from what that of Piter Gusbager – Wahfir Kosasih, who utilized their *tim sukses* from the *paguyuban/kerukunan* and Indigenous Papuans of Keerom. Ultimately, this method was effective, and Piter Gusbager – Wahfir Kosasih won the 2020 election.

While the *tim sukses* in South Sorong was more than just a political campaign team, it was simply that in Keerom. In Keerom, the *tim sukses* was disbanded after the results of

the district head election announcements were made, or at least after the political leaders allocated rewards for the *tim sukses*' success. After that, the *tim sukses* will be inactive until the next election. One of the reasons behind their success in Keerom is that the team simply tried to attract the highest number of voters, no matter what ethnic group they are from. They did this by allocating funds for community projects, holding social gatherings, and recruiting heads of ethnic groups as members of the *tim sukses*.⁵⁸

Some people in Keerom hoped that *paguyuban*, *kerukunan*, *ikatan*, LMA, and DAS would be neutral in elections, but this has not happened. People initially maintained that the associations and organizations of their ethnic groups should not formally be involved in political practice, such as by directly supporting a certain candidate. However, they realized that the ethnic group is a significant factor in winning elections. If they did not involve in the election, they would not have access to the local government for community development projects, bureaucratic opportunities, nor to represent their group in the regency. It was uncertain what would happen to their group if they were not involved in politics, so their associations became part of candidates' *tim sukses*, often even managing to recruit candidates from their own ethnic group (or other favoured ethnic groups) to represent them. As a consequence, these associations and organizations became direct players in promoting and supporting their own political candidates.

Separatist Logic: Political Accommodation

Thirdly, separatist logic as the demand by some groups of Indigenous Papuan stresses the importance of accommodation by the state as well as local governments. The challenge of disintegration will always be faced by all states, and policy accommodation is one strategy to prevent it. This logic happens in the society of South Sorong and in both bureaucracy and society in Keerom.

The separatist logic in South Sorong occurs in society, by which the ethnic group demand to be outside of the local government. While the popular demand for secession from Indonesia is as high in South Sorong as it is in Keerom, this may be because the local government is largely managed by local ethnic groups. Both the state and the local government accommodates different ethnic groups and their demands, particularly approaching elections. The process undertaken is to engage the opposition in society. The district head does this process by approaching ethnic groups and bureaucrats that are seen as representing diverse groups and holding strategic positions. If the district head is re-elected, those with different views will regain their positions, enabling them to continue representing their ethnic group in society.

However, recruitment and placement in Keerom's bureaucracy do not have the same patterns as those in South Sorong, where the consideration of bureaucratic representation based on ethnicity is more prominent. In Keerom, there is political accommodation from various groups that push their family or group members to be part of the bureaucracy. This is separatist logic, as these groups will likely boycott and refuse to be a part of the local government if their demands are not accommodated. It is also indicated by how relatively common it is to hear the remark of wanting to separate from

⁵⁸ Interview with Japi, 9 February 2019

Indonesia if they are not accommodated by the government. This cannot be separated from the fact that Keerom has been classified as a 'red zone' by the Indonesian military since the 1960s. This 'red zone' means that there are military operations in place that aim to eradicate OPM in Keerom in order to maintain security and defend the state.

The discussion on political accommodation in the bureaucracy can be seen in the top-priority demand of Indigenous Keerom people to hold bureaucratic positions. For example, we can find the term 'Indigenous Keerom' appearing in recruitment ads and job postings, ranging from the heads of agencies and boards to the heads of subdistricts. In bureaucratic recruitment, the term 'Indigenous Keerom' is used to differentiate their priority in the bureaucratic recruitment from other Indigenous Papuans who reside in or apply to become civil servants in Keerom. The term 'Indigenous Keerom' does not only refer to the Indigenous Papuan sub-ethnic groups from Keerom, but also the demand for prioritizing the Indigenous groups of Keerom more than other ethnic groups. The Special Autonomy Law serves as a stepping-stone for Indigenous Keerom people to demand accommodation from the regional government, including bureaucratic agencies. With this basis of accommodation, the regional government categorizes the population of Keerom into four groups based on priority:⁵⁹

1. Keerom I (first priority): Indigenous Keerom whose parents are from the Indigenous ethnic groups of Keerom (*Asli Keerom karena bapak dan ibunya Asli Keerom*),
2. Keerom II (second priority); Indigenous Papuan whose mother is from Keerom and father is indigenous Papuan not from Keerom or non-Papuan (*Asli Papua karena ibu kandung Asli Keerom dan bapaknya Asli Papua dan/atau Pendatang*),
3. Keerom III (third priority): Indigenous Papuans whose parents are indigenous Papuans not from Keerom (*Asli Papua yang bukan Asli Keerom*)
4. Keerom IV (fourth priority): non-Papuans (migrants) who were born and raised in Keerom.

These four different identities exist due to the demand to accommodate Indigenous Keerom, who must be differentiated from the other Indigenous Papuans who live in Keerom as a result of either spontaneous or government-sponsored local transmigration in the 1980s. Those who belong in the Keerom I category or are Indigenous Keerom are therefore prioritized in bureaucratic recruitment. The priority has also been implemented in education scholarships and free healthcare, which prioritize Indigenous Keerom.

On the surface, this categorization creates ambiguity around the term 'Indigenous Papuan', but we can analyze this by using constructivism, considering this term as an ethnic identity that cannot be fixed and singular. It depends on the setting, in which the term can refer to all Indigenous Papuans who live in the land of Papua, such as in the setting of electoral politics to win the election. Meanwhile in the bureaucracy, the term can be different due to demands to be considered top priority in recruitment and placement in structural positions. The term Indigenous Papuans can be therefore be made even more specific to Indigenous Keerom so as to differentiate from Indigenous Papuan who live in Keerom but are from other areas of Papua.

⁵⁹ See Peraturan Bupati (Head of District Regulation) Number 47/2017 about funding for students from Keerom.

Nevertheless, accommodation by prioritizing Indigenous Keerom in bureaucratic and political positions remains limited. The posts of heads of agencies and boards are, in reality, mainly held migrants and Indigenous Papuan (non-Keerom) who have lived for a long time in Keerom. The main reason for this phenomenon is that the district head accommodated non-Papuans as members of their *tim sukses* to gather the majority vote. Although it is essential to prioritize Indigenous Papuans, the local politics in Keerom has created difficulties for this to be done in practice.⁶⁰

This presents many demands from Indigenous Keerom to the state and local government in order for the government to accommodate them. In the most extreme way, Indigenous Keerom people may express their great disappointment by joining the separatist movement, namely OPM. This was the reason expressed by former OPM combatants such as Benjamin Menikir, an Indigenous Keerom who in 2015 returned to Indonesia. Likewise, several informants who admitted having been a part of the OPM movement in Keerom stated that the main reason was due to the disappointment of feeling marginalized and not accommodated by the state and the local government.⁶¹

Conclusion

This study reveals the complex relationship between ethnicity and democracy in South Sorong (West Papua Province) and Keerom (Papua Province). The subdivision of the land of Papua into new provinces has led to arguments about ethnic identity, both benefitting and hindering the region's political representation and development. The Indonesian government needs to do more to address the lack of political representation, social and economic development, and human resources in West Papua, and to implement the revised Special Autonomy Law through real and meaningful action. The specialness of West Papua lies in democracy, and the construction of its future must rely on local democratic approaches, rather than militaristic ones. Further studies are needed to explore the development and changes taking place in West Papua, and to consider the effects of urbanization and modernization on ethnic politics and democracy in the region.

Moreover, the government should take a more active role in ensuring that the Special Autonomy Law is implemented effectively to address the problems of underdevelopment and marginalization faced by Indigenous Papuans. This can be done by prioritizing the participation of Indigenous Papuans in decision-making processes as well as in the allocation of resources. The *kursi otsus* (Special Autonomy seats) in the local parliament for Indigenous Papuan representation must also be implemented in the upcoming 2024 election. This is one of ways to encourage and support the development of local democracy, enabling Indigenous Papuans to have a greater say in their political and economic future. In the long term, this local democracy will be important for discussing and addressing the root causes of conflict, such as land disputes and unequal distribution of resources, which have contributed to the sense of marginalization and frustration felt by Indigenous Papuans. Addressing these underlying issues can contribute to creating inclusive and participatory democracy for Indigenous Papuans.

⁶⁰ Interview with Rudy, one of Success Team of the current Regent, February 8, 2019

⁶¹ Interview with Aslan and Edi, former OPM combatants, February 6, 2019

The comparisons between South Sorong and Keerom have as best as possible depicted the land of Papua as a region with diverse geographical features, social and cultural aspects, and economic and political conditions. Further studies may explore the development and changes in the regions. This study compares two regencies prior to the 2022 *pemekaran* (subdivision) of new provinces in Papua. There needs to be more case studies to obtain comparisons between regencies and cities in the new provinces, especially in the new regions of the Central Papua and South Papua. Moreover, in regard to local political phenomena in Papua, it is also important to consider the setting changes of the region that are directed toward urban conditions, as marked by the influence of the high-level urbanization and modernization in older cities such as Jayapura, Sorong, and Timika. These cities can illustrate different explanations of ethnic politics and democracy.

In summary, this study argues that ethnicity does not undermine democracy in South Sorong and Keerom. Rather, ethnicity is an essential aspect of local politics and needs to be considered in any analysis of democratization in West Papua. To strengthen democracy, the government should implement non-military approaches, prioritize the implementation of the Special Autonomy Law, encourage the development of local democracy, and address the root causes of the ethnic conflict.

Acknowledgement:

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Lloyd Cox and Associate Prof. Jaap Timmer for their guidance and support for this project. Their insights and expertise have been valuable in shaping the direction of this work.

References

- Aspinall, Edward. 2011. "Democratization and Ethnic Politics in Indonesia: Nine Theses." *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 11(2), 289-319. doi:10.1017/S1598240800007190
- Berenschot, Ward, and Aspinall, Edward. 2020. "How Clientelism Varies: Comparing Patronage Democracies." *Democratization*, 27(1), 1-19. doi:10.1080/13510347.2019.1645129
- Bourchier, David, and Hadiz, Vedi. 2014. *Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader*. Routledge.
- Chandra, Kanchan. 2012. *Constructivist Theories of Ethnic Politics*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Chandra, Kanchan, and Wilkinson, Steven. 2008. "Measuring the Effect of 'Ethnicity'". *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(4-5), 515-563. doi:10.1177/0010414007313240
- Chauvel, Richard. 2005. "Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaptation." In: Vol. 14. *Policy Studies*. Washington, D.C., USA: East-West Center.
- . 2010. "Electoral Politics and Democratic Freedoms in Papua." In *Aspinall Edward and Mietzner Marcus* (Eds.), *Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia* (307-329). Singapore: ISEAS Publishing.
- . 2021. "Pemekaran: Fragmentation, Marginalization and Co-option." In Riwanto; Pamungkas Tirtosudarmo, Cahyo (Ed.), *Emansipasi Papua: Tulisan Para Sahabat untuk Mengenang dan Menghormati Muridan S. Widjojo (1967-2014)*. Jakarta: Imparsial.
- Chauvel, Richard, and Bhakti, Ikrar Nusa. 2004. "The Papua Conflict: Jakarta's Perceptions and Policies." In: Vol. 5. *Policy Studies* 5. Washington D.C., USA: East-West Center.
- Elmslie, Jimmy. 2001. *Irian Jaya under the Gun: Indonesian Economic Development versus West*

- Papuan Nationalism*. Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawai'i Press.
- Firth, Stewart. 2019. "Geo-Political Overview of Melanesia." *In The Melanesian World* (Vol. 1, 15): Routledge.
- Goodrick, Delwyn. 2014. "Comparative Case Studies." *Methodological Brief*, 9.
- Hadiz, Vedi R. 2004. "The Rise of Neo-Third Worldism? the Indonesian Trajectory and the Consolidation of Illiberal Democracy." *Third World Quarterly*, 25(1), 55-71. doi:10.1080/0143659042000185336
- . 2017. "Indonesia's Year of Democratic Setbacks: Towards a New Phase of Deepening Illiberalism?", *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 53(3), 261-278. doi:10.1080/00074918.2017.1410311
- Haryanto. 2017. "Power in the Tradition of Kain Timur Exchange: A Study of Using Tradition to Get Support in the Local Election in South Sorong 2010." *PCD Jurnal UGM*, 5(1).
- . 2020. "Boundary Crossers: The Transformation of Civil Society Elites in Indonesia's Post-Authoritarian Era." *Politics and Governance*, 8, 120-129. doi:10.17645/pag.v8i3.3011
- Haryanto, Sukmajati, Mada, and Lay, Cornelis. 2019. "Territory, Class, and Kinship: A Case Study of an Indonesian Regional Election." *Asian Politics and Policy*, 11(1).
- Hefner, Robert W. 2005. *Remaking Muslim Politics Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization*: Princeton University Press.
- Hilman, Ben. 2012. "Power-Sharing and Political Party Engineering in Conflict-Prone Societies: Experiment in Aceh," *Conflict and Security Development*, 12(2), 149-169.
- Holmes, Terrell D. 2017. "A Comparative Case Study Analysis of the Impact of Leadership on Distance Education in Higher Education." (Thesis of Dissertation), Delaware State University, Delaware.
- King, Peter. 2004. *West Papua and Indonesia since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy or Chaos?* Sydney: USNW Press Book.
- . 2006. "In Defence of the Papua Sympathisers: A Rejoinder to Ed Aspinall," *Policy and Society*, 25(4), 131-137. doi:10.1016/S1449-4035(06)70094-7
- Kusuma, Chandra. 2022. "Modified Historical Institutionalism. In The Rise of the Indonesian Financial Service Authority", 21-53, US: Springer.
- Liddle, R William. 1992. "Indonesia's Threefold Crisis." *Journal of Democracy*, 3(4), 60-74.
- Mason, Jennifer. 2004. The SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods. In. *Thousand Oaks Thousand Oaks*, California: SAGE Publications, Inc.
- McDonald, Matt, and Wilson, Lee. 2017. "Trouble in Paradise: Contesting security in Bali," *Security Dialogue*, 48(3), 241-258. doi:10.1177/0967010617692925
- McGibbon, Rodd. 2004. "Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution?," *Policy Studies* (10). Washington, D. C., USA: East-West Center.
- Mietzner, Marcus. 2007. "Local Elections and Autonomy in Papua and Aceh: Mitigating or Fueling Secessionism?," *Indonesia* (84), 1-39.
- Musa'ad, Mohammad Abud. 2012. *Quo Vadis Otsus Papua: Diantara Tuntutan "Rekonstruksi" dan "Referendum"*. Yogyakarta: Thafa Media.
- Nordholt, Henk Schulte. 2015. "From Contest State to Patronage Democracy: The Longue Durée of Clientelism in Indonesia." In David Henley and Henk Schulte Nordholt (Eds.), *Environment, Trade and Society in Soetheast Asia: A Longue Durée Perspective*: Brill.
- Ondawame, Otto. 2000. "One People, One Soul: West Papuan Nationalism and the Organisa Papua Merdeka (OPM)/ Free Papua Movement". (PhD), The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.
- Power, Thomas, and Warburton, Eve. 2020. *Democracy in Indonesia: From Stagnation to Regression?* Singapore: ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

- Purwoko, Bambang. 2016. "Bureaucracy and the Politics of Identity: A Study on the Influence of Ethnicity on the Bureaucrat Recruitment Process in Sorong Selatan Regency, West Papua, Indonesia," *Jurnal Studi Pemerintahan*, 7(4), 516-550.
- Rusdiarti, Suma Riella, and Pamungkas, Cahyo. 2017. *Updating Papua Road Map: Proses Perdamaian, Politik Kaum Muda, dan Diaspora Papua*. Jakarta: LIPI and Yayasan Obor.
- Savirani, Amalinda and Törnquist, Olle. 2015. *Reclaiming the state: Overcoming problems of democracy in post-Soeharto Indonesia*: Yogyakarta: Penerbit PolGov.
- Selway, Joel Sawat. 2015. "Ethnicity and democracy." In *Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Democratization*: Routledge.
- Singh, Bilveer. 2008. *Papua: Geopolitics and the Quest for Nationhood*. New York, USA: Taylor and Francis.
- Stange, Gunnar, and Patock, Roman. 2010. "From Rebels to Rulers and Legislators: The Political Transformation of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia," *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 95-120.
- Steven Fish, M, and Kroenig, Matthew. 2006. "Diversity, Conflict and Democracy: Some evidence from Eurasia and East Europe," *Democratization*, 13(5), 828-842.
- Suryawan, I Nguhah. 2015. "Siasat Elit Mencuri Kuasa Negara di Kabupaten Manokwari Selatan Provinsi Papua Barat." (PhD), Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.
- Tebay, Neles. 2005. *West Papua: Struggle for Peace with Justice*. London, UK: Chatolic Institute for International Relations.
- Timmer, Jaap. 2007. "Erring Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua." In Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (Eds.), *Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, 459-482, Leiden: KITLV.
- . 2008. "Spectres of Indonesianisation and secession in Papua." Paper Presented at the Seminar on the *Act of Free Choice*, Institute of Netherlands History, The Hague.
- van Klinken, Gerry. 2009. "Patronage Democracy in Provincial Indonesia." In *Olle Törnquist, Neil Webster, and Kristian Stokke (Eds.), Rethinking Popular Representation*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- van Klinken, Gerry. 2019. "Indonesia: Twenty Years of Democracy," by Jamie S. Davidson. *Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde / Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia*, 175(2-3), 381-383. doi:<https://doi.org/10.1163/22134379-17502010>
- Widjojo, Muridan. 2009. *Papua Road Map: Negotiating the Past, Improving the Present and Securing the Future* (First ed.). Jakarta: LIPI, Yayasan TIFA, and Yayasan Obor.
- Wilkes, Rima, and Wu, Cary. 2018. "Ethnicity, Democracy, Trust: A Majority-Minority Approach," *Social Forces*, 97(1), 465-494. doi:10.1093/sf/soy027
- Winters, Jeffrey A. 2014. "Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia." In Ford Michele and B. Pepinsky Thomas (Eds.), *Beyond Oligarchy*, 11-34. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Yin, Robert K. (2014). *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. Los Angeles: Sage.