

Precarious Coexistence in Maluku: Fear and Trauma in Post-Conflict Christian-Muslim Relations

Geger Riyanto¹

Asia Research Centre, Universitas Indonesia, Indonesia

Email: geger.riyanto09@ui.ac.id

Abstract

This paper examines the precarious coexistence between Muslims and Christians in post-conflict Maluku, Indonesia. The lasting effects of brutal conflict have left fear and trauma as the dominant emotions in the relationships of local residents. While these emotions are commonly seen as hindrances to peace by scholars and non-scholars alike, in post-conflict societies, they are inescapable and deeply ingrained. Nevertheless, they not only drive division, but also the desire to maintain peace. In Maluku, both Christians and Muslims are bound by the shared understanding that their current peaceful coexistence is delicate, and they must be cautious in their interactions with people of different religions, despite ongoing animosity and mistrust. This ongoing reality in Maluku calls for a reassessment of the normative tendency in peace discourses, which expect peace to be either ideal or impaired and tend not to be contextual in evaluating peace. To understand post-conflict coexistence better, we need to comprehend how emotions towards other groups operate in the emerging social settings.

Keywords: peace, Christian-Muslim relations; post-conflict societies; Maluku

Introduction

The people of Maluku, Indonesia, feel a sense of disbelief when they reflect on the peace they currently enjoy. Only two decades ago, the region was engulfed in a significant sectarian conflict following the collapse of Suharto's New Order regime. The conflict, which began in 1999, resulted in the deaths of 5,000 people, the displacement of hundreds of thousands, and countless cycles of revenge that have divided Muslims and Christians.

"I cannot believe it, we finally have peace here," a middle-aged Butonese man who lived in Hative Kecil, Ambon, Maluku, remarked suddenly as he kept me company while I waited for his niece. He was one of those who did not leave Ambon during the conflict and had to contend with the difficulties of going to work in the years following the conflict as the situation remained tense. "Back then, it was impossible to think that

¹ Geger Riyanto is Postdoctoral Fellow at Asia Research Centre, Universitas Indonesia, Indonesia.

peace like this will take place,” he explained. A similar sentiment was expressed by a couple I met at their home in Batumerah. The husband was a Butonese trader, and the wife was a researcher and a member of the village’s ruling clan. They had sought refuge in Buton – an island in Southeast Sulawesi, several hundred kilometres to the southwest of Maluku – during the conflict and described their time there as unbearable. They felt unwelcome, despite staying with relatives, and deeply missed their lives in Ambon. They returned to Batumerah in 2004, when the situation was still somewhat tense. “It is unbelievable that we have peace now,” the wife commented. Both of these conversations took place recently, in the middle of 2022.

This shared bewilderment highlights the value of peace among Malukans. Peace, which once was thought to be impossible, is now a reality, hence they feel they must treasure it. Suspicion and enmity towards those of different religions have indeed grown as a result of the conflict. Not only do people of different religions now live separately, in contrast to their pre-conflict settling arrangements, but inter-religious distrust has become more evident. Suspicions that those of different religions are conspiring against one’s own community are common among both Muslims and Christians, and many still live with grudges from the past. Nevertheless, wary of having to experience another bloody conflict in their lifetime, people are actively making efforts to preserve the delicate harmony. Residents swiftly respond to threats of social breakdown and demonstrate the willingness to coexist with those of different religions, even if the expression may appear superficial. Peace is tenuous, so it must be treated with the utmost care.

In this paper, I explore the complexity of everyday peace in Maluku. Many theories of peace fail to consider this complexity when examining post-conflict societies. Both peace studies and peacemaking actors commonly view peace as a clear-cut circumstance and phase, where failures to prevent post-conflict minor skirmishes or to strip intergroup suspicion are seen as indicating that peace is failing or negative. Peace is also expected to provide a holistic sense of security. It should not simply be the absence of conflict and violence but also a state that caters to the well-being of its subjects.² This normative theoretical leaning is expected, as theories of peace are often conceived to immediately contribute to peacebuilding endeavors or to be critical of them. However, the coexistence between two previously warring religious factions is murky, fraught with conflicting emotions and relationships, and may feel constantly perilous. Moreover, as much as peace theories posit negative emotions to be inherently detrimental to peace, fear and trauma are inevitable and will persist in post-conflict settings. People must work through the fear and trauma caused by the conflict. An advocate of the everyday peace perspective, Roger Mac Ginty, puts this into perspective: “It is easy to say ‘people should move on’. Some people cannot move on because they have been traumatised, lost loved ones, or suffered grievous hurt or physical injury.”³

As we delve into how fear and trauma play out in post-conflict settings, we discover that they operate differently than expected. Even though these emotions are often considered incompatible with ideal intergroup relationships, they play a crucial role in maintaining peaceful coexistence in Maluku. The anxiety that peace may be fragile and

² Shields 2017, Clark 2009, Galtung 1967.

³ E-International Relations 2022.

that the situation could easily revert to what it was decades ago has prompted residents to prioritize social cohesion, despite still harboring suspicions of followers of different religions. Furthermore, as these emotions create a binding and lasting mood that characterizes the collective emotion of post-conflict Maluku, we may ask an important question about coexistence in contemporary Indonesia: is what happened in Maluku indicative of the transition to stability in other locales of the region, suggesting that post-conflict form of coexistence is a social cleavage unified by anxiety over societal breakdown? Observers who pay attention to other Indonesian locales recuperating from similar conflicts around the same time offer arguments that confirm this to be the case.⁴ Reconciliation is being promoted in these locales, but this tends to be an elite agenda, toward which common people are rarely invested. Past grievances are not resolved, and what makes post-conflict coexistence work instead is a complex mix of factors, of which incentives and threats are an important part. The response provided by this paper is principally not removed from these preceding observations, and the unfolding post-conflict emotions are key in showing why such is the case.

The paper is based on material collected by various researchers, including ethnographic studies related and unrelated to the theme of this paper, which were conducted in Maluku. These studies provide valuable information that corresponds to the aim of my research. Additionally, I visited Maluku several times between 2015 and 2022 for ethnographic fieldwork, spending a total of 12 months in the field. Along with secondary data from media reports, this body of information provides a solid foundation for analyzing how everyday peace is practiced in the Maluku region.

Normative and Everyday Peace

Fear and trauma are chronically central in post-conflict social lives. Mental health researchers have established that individuals in post-conflict societies are prone to lifetime post-traumatic stress disorder.⁵ Moreover, the pain and resentment does not stay only among those who directly experienced the traumatic events, but are transmitted to the generations born after the conflicts,⁶ perpetuated through vivid anecdotes or even bodily reactions. Past conflicts are also remembered socially, such as by evoking them in rituals or making the narratives a matter of group pride, resulting in them simultaneously being more durable and prevalent than individual memories.⁷ This inevitability of fear and trauma in post-conflict societies makes it curious that peace research seldom delves into how they operate in these settings. When these emotions are mentioned, they are presumed as obstacles to the attainment of genuine peaceful coexistence, limiting the opportunity to understand them properly.

Johan Galtung, for instance, argues that positive peace should be free from fear.⁸ While other studies are not as explicit as Galtung in spelling out their normative

⁴ Duncan 2016, Bertrand 2004.

⁵ Marthoenis, Meutia, Sofyan and Schouler-Ocak 2018, Wilker, Pfeiffer, Kolassa, Koslowski, Elbert and Kolassa 2015, Jong, Komproe, Ommeren, Masri, Araya, Khaled, Put and Somansundaram 2001.

⁶ Burchert, Stammel and Knaevelsrud 2017.

⁷ Argenti and Schramm 2009.

⁸ Galtung 1967.

expectations, fear is still primarily treated as a problem to be solved. Studies attribute fear and insecurity as emotions that lead individuals to seek safety from threats, which results in them becoming oriented inward or towards their in-group, thereby aggravating polarization and becoming a barrier to peace.⁹ According to these studies, as people become preoccupied with security dilemmas and over-sensitive to signals of danger, they are constantly ready to defend themselves, making it difficult for them to imagine committing to peaceful resolutions with opposing groups, and as a result, the hope for peaceful coexistence is diminished. Fear has also been argued to be associated with the acquisition of new information that is biased towards rejecting conflict resolution opportunities.¹⁰ On the other hand, the topic of trauma has more or less received the same treatment, being recognized as hindering peace by leading individuals towards self-preservation.¹¹

The rapid proliferation of reconciliation practices across the globe,¹² often promoted by external parties,¹³ further demonstrates how the aforementioned assumption about fear and trauma takes hold in practical peace discourses. The negative emotions are seen as barriers to peace and so are expected to be alleviated through reconciliation. However, as we move further away from the 1990s heyday of reconciliation efforts, those involved in reconciliation initiatives have come to realize the ineffectiveness of such approaches. Reconciliation endeavors are often either elite-driven,¹⁴ ceremonial,¹⁵ or fail to address the structural disparities and divisions that were central to the conflicts in the first place.¹⁶ Their failures indicate that reconciliation endeavors are decontextualized, and the bleak emotions they aim to remove linger profoundly among the supposed subjects of the initiatives, suggesting their unavoidable lasting impact and interweaving with post-conflict social contexts. With its restorative promise, reconciliation may seem desirable, but bringing it into reality requires the impractical work of wholly transforming the established social relationships and emotional dispositions.

Nevertheless, such treatment of fear and trauma in peace discourses is to be expected. Kenneth E. Boulding argues peace studies have been recognized as an inherently normative discipline.¹⁷ Peace studies not only seek to understand the dynamics of peace and conflict, but also to make interventions and establish meaningful peace. Boulding contrasts this with positive science, which remains disinterested in being directly involved in the subject it studies. Proponents of peace research consciously view conflicts as pathologies to be managed. This tendency is undeniably clear when Galtung¹⁸

⁹ Lake and Rothchild 1996, Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal 2006, Maoz and McCauley 2008, Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Porat and Bar-Tal 2014.

¹⁰ Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Porat and Bar-Tal 2014.

¹¹ Sabucedo, Mar Durán and Rodríguez 2011, Canetti, Hirschberger, Rapaport, Elad-Strenger, Ein-Dor, Rosenzweig, Pyszczynski and Hobfoll 2018.

¹² Murithi 2009, Gellman 2008, Racioppi and O'Sullivan See 2007.

¹³ Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013.

¹⁴ Babo-Soares 2004.

¹⁵ Bräuchler and Naucke 2017, Duncan 2016.

¹⁶ Du Toit 2017.

¹⁷ Boulding 1978.

¹⁸ Galtung 1967.

differentiates between negative and positive peace—peace that is simply a state without direct violence and one that consists of the absence of structural violence. The latter, Galtung adds, also necessitates an egalitarian distribution of power and resources. Galtung's demarcation has long been criticized for being far too broad, rhetorical, and not academically useful.¹⁹ It fails to account for how peace can be initiated differently in various contexts.²⁰ Still, this demarcation is one of the most influential conceptual works in peace research. Its usage, despite its apparent problem of being more of a persuasive tool rather than an analytical tool, in scrutinizing regional reconciliation,²¹ national defense strategy,²² or even to tackle classroom conflict²³ further suggests the normative characteristic of peace studies. One of its clearest applications to promote the ideal form of peace is its usage in the Global Peace Index.²⁴

On the other hand, emotions that are considered socially unacceptable are often overlooked in various scholarly inquiries, not only in peace research. This is true in the cases of hatred²⁵ and mistrust.²⁶ When these emotions are the focus of an inquiry, they are often assumed in advance as a problem to be solved, leading to their unproductive simplification. For example, when mistrust is identified as detrimental to social fabric, as is the case in literature on social capital²⁷ that predominates social science in the 2000s, we are unable to see its inevitability in relationships, how social proximity may potentially cultivate instead it of diminish it,²⁸ or how its projection to outsiders may enhance in-group bonds.²⁹ Observations have also shown that negative emotions can lead to prosocial intergroup interactions, contradicting widespread preconceptions. The feeling of victimization can motivate a community to aid unrelated others who have suffered similar experiences,³⁰ and the desire for communal survival can promote intergroup harmony.³¹

As such, it is necessary to understand emotions within the specific settings where they are articulated. While it is true that fear and trauma can be translated into security-oriented and aggressive conflict policies by political brokers in many cases of interstate conflicts, where such policies are reciprocated with similar attitudes by opposing societies, which in turn perpetuates the conflicts, the situation is different within a post-conflict society like Maluku. The Maluku conflict itself was caused by a complex interplay of several contingent factors, including the disorderly Indonesian democratic transition and the growth of the Muslim population in Maluku due to decades of spontaneous migration. These factors disrupted the traditional power balance between Christians and Muslims in Maluku, leading to political mobilization and a sense of unease that eventually

¹⁹ Boulding 1977.

²⁰ Harris 2004.

²¹ Clark 2009.

²² Shields 2017.

²³ Cremin and Bevington 2017.

²⁴ Institute for Economics and Peace 2022.

²⁵ Halperin 2015.

²⁶ Carey 2017.

²⁷ Putnam 2000.

²⁸ Geschiere 2003.

²⁹ Mühlfried 2018.

³⁰ Warner, Wohl and Branscombe 2014.

³¹ Hirschberger and Ein-Dor 2020.

escalated a minor clash into a widespread and prolonged conflict.³² However, as opportunities to gain from the tumultuous transition and global jihad funding,³³ which exacerbated the conflict in the first place, are now absent, residents' negative emotions towards people of different religions are articulated differently than in contexts where political entrepreneurs can continually capitalize on them. Context is crucial and it is important to reassess the notion that bleak emotions always threaten peace, as this overlooks the multifaceted nature of social relationships.

This need to identify how post-conflict shared feelings actually constitute the coexistence of formerly fighting groups is the reason why turning our attention to the everyday is of importance in peace studies, something that ironically must be reasserted here as a response to the normative inclination of this field. Peace studies initially proposed turning to the everyday as it grew weary of post-Cold War peacebuilding, which is often driven by external and powerful governing actors and institutions and tends to be problem-solving, rational-institutionalist, and reductionist.³⁴ The shift towards the everyday is expected to reveal why such peacebuilding endeavors mostly fail, which is primarily because they ignore the needs and lives of people immediately affected by the conflicts.³⁵

I am interested in focusing on the everyday because it allows us to uncover the marginal and mundane spaces that are omitted from formal political discourse.³⁶ Interestingly, the omitted spaces include the role of 'socially unacceptable' emotions in shaping post-conflict lives. By delving into social practices as they are being carried out intuitively or reflexively—which constitutes everyday actions—we may have a better grasp on the established and effective norms. De Certeau,³⁷ who inspired peace and conflict scholars to focus their attention on the everyday, made it clear that when subjects do not know what they are doing, their acts hold more meaning than they realize. In line with this, I believe what binds the formerly conflicting actors is located in the everyday. Specifically, it is worth examining the everyday shared feelings. As suggested by Suffla, Malherbe, and Seedat,³⁸ the politico-affective space, which can be associated with the everyday shared feelings, influences the interaction between individuals, "binding them into a politicized multitude".

While the key emotions examined in this paper are often excluded in peace discourses, they are also considered odd within practical discussions about managing diversity in Indonesia. Discussions on how to manage diversity in the country are as pervasive as they can get, given Indonesia's incredible cultural diversity and the high stakes that come with it. Interestingly, analyses from those who feel obliged to provide recommendations, mostly Indonesian commentators or policy analysts, suggest the need for instilling values that are needed to strengthen social harmony.³⁹ It is not surprising that

³² Klinken 2007.

³³ Braithwaite 2013.

³⁴ Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013.

³⁵ Richmond 2009.

³⁶ Berents and McEvoy-Levy 2015.

³⁷ De Certeau 1984, 56.

³⁸ Suffla, Malherbe and Seedat 2020, 352.

³⁹ Rumahuru and Gaspersz 2021, Anwar 2021, Ali 2011.

these values are prosocial. This attitude reflects the position that the state has taken since its early days, aiming to inculcate values in its citizens to foster respect for their fellow citizens and celebrate the country's diversity.⁴⁰ It is hard to expect negative emotions to be discussed as anything more than as social problems within this equally normative sphere of discussion.

Meanwhile, when engaging with everyday lives in post-conflict societies, fear and trauma can be the prevalent emotions that bind communities together. In Maluku, the past sectarian conflict left individuals with painful memories that continue to haunt them to this day. Nevertheless, these feelings also contribute to social cohesion. Everyone has become constantly observant of anything that may threaten social integration, including their own behaviour towards followers of other religions. As residents do not take post-conflict stability for granted, they engage with individuals of other religions with great care, creating layers of interactions between different social groups to enable the expressions of unease while maintaining their precarious coexistence.

Uneasy Post-Conflict Coexistence

I will begin by expanding on the post-conflict situation in Maluku and its development. In describing this situation, we face a technical challenge that Stephen Ryan⁴¹ highlighted when criticizing the 1992 United Nations (UN) peace agenda. He states, "No society is 'post-conflict', since conflict is ubiquitous." In Maluku, although in a more dispersed form, the conflict continued even after a peace treaty was signed in Malino, South Sulawesi, in February 2002. Approximately 150 Muslim and Christian leaders were brought together by the national government for dialogue. Some of these leaders had previously met and expressed their exhaustion over the fighting and desire for peace, which gave way to the Malino meeting.⁴² The terms they agreed upon in Malino are referred to this day as the Malino Treaty.

Following the treaty, the conflict indeed de-escalated, as people relinquished their weapons after seeing their religious leaders had reached an agreement to stop the fighting. The two-day meeting in Malino was nationally broadcast, and people in Maluku were glued to their televisions. This outcome was not achieved through top-down militaristic interventions by the national government, as the military was seen as part of the problem instead of the solution. War fatigue also played a role, as earlier attempts to establish a reconciliation council had failed. Additionally, funding to Islamist and anti-Christian militia group Laskar Jihad from Saudi Arabian financiers ceased, resulting in the groups' fighters returning to their home towns in Java and Sulawesi.⁴³ Nevertheless, during this time, scattered attacks and clashes still occasionally occurred. For example, in April 2002, a bomb exploded in Ambon, followed by an attack on the Christian village of Soya. This period was referred to by locals as "*su aman-aman*", meaning "it was kind of safe".⁴⁴ People began to resume their pre-conflict activities, but remained extremely

⁴⁰ Ramage 1997, Morfit 1981.

⁴¹ Ryan 2013, 28.

⁴² Ernas 2012.

⁴³ Braithwaite 2013.

⁴⁴ Wardani 2020.

vigilant for signs of an attack, such as the sound of explosions, crying and shouting, or people banging on utility poles.

Two years later, the breakaway movement South Maluku Republic (RMS) held a parade, which sparked another large-scale conflict throughout Ambon. This led to tens of thousands of people leaving their homes to seek refuge. This was the last major riot in Maluku for some time, and people began to identify their situation as “*su aman*” (“it was safe”) afterward. However, inter-religious relationships were still frail, much more so than before the conflict. People found themselves more divided than ever, as both Christians and Muslims now lived in separate settlements due to the fear of having to live next to people of other religions. When the Ambonese refugees returned from other islands after the situation had improved, they only wished to live with people of their own religion, which led to Ambon becoming a city segregated along religious lines to this day.⁴⁵ Ambon has fifty villages, but only two of them (Wayame and Suli Atas) still maintain religious diversity.⁴⁶

In other parts of Maluku, such as southern Seram, Christians remained in areas where Christians were in the majority, and vice versa for Muslims.⁴⁷ This also happened with traders and service workers whose lines of work required them to travel around the island. During the “*su aman*” period, Christians, who traditionally worked in education and government, also began working in the transportation sector and as entrepreneurs. This was because people preferred to work within their own religiously segregated areas.⁴⁸ In Ambon, some people who had to regularly venture across both Muslim and Christian areas, such as public transport drivers, vigilantly maintained a neutral stance, like using neutral pronouns such as ‘kaka’ (older sibling) to address passengers. Some areas in the border regions and city center, such as cafes, become neutral zones where individuals of different religions could meet and socialize with one another.⁴⁹

Even today, people remain cautious when entering territories deemed to belong to people of different religions. I noticed that my local Muslim friends did not seek assistance from residents when their motorcycles broke down in Christian territories, both in Ambon and Seram. Instead, they chose to push their vehicles until they reached Muslim villages, even though they were quite distant. People tend to imagine that those of different religions may pose a danger to them in the broadest sense of the word. When misfortune occurs, the cause is often immediately attributed to those of different religions. Even if those of different religions do not pose a plausible threat, people’s imaginations can run wild when considering the ways in which they may harm them, leading to bizarre conspiracy theories. For example, rumors of child kidnappings once spread in northern Seram, where I conducted my fieldwork. Local Muslims immediately suspected that the Christians were responsible and began claiming that they wanted to sell the children’s organs to China. Similarly, when a Muslim headmaster was investigated for corruption, local Muslims suspected that Christians were likely setting her up.

⁴⁵ Ansori, Sukandar, Peranto, Karib, Cholid and Rasyid 2014.

⁴⁶ Pamungkas 2015.

⁴⁷ Ellen 2014, 274.

⁴⁸ Pamungkas 2015, 32-33.

⁴⁹ Rohman 2020.

Due to such suspicions, a notable incident took place in 2010 at Pattimura University when lecturers and students were angered by the imbalance of Christian and Muslim top-level officials. They also thought that the university's lecturer recruitment system favored the Christians. Claiming to cite the Malino Treaty,⁵⁰ the protesters argued that the Christian-Muslim power balance should be maintained. When the conflict intensified, some of the campus buildings were set on fire. Pattimura University has been perceived as a Christian stronghold since its establishment in the 1970s. Many Muslim parents are hesitant to send their children there, fearing their children will be converted to Christianity.⁵¹ The new post-conflict circumstance has provided an opportunity for Muslims to demand a power balance in the university. On the other hand, some Christians, realizing that Muslims were now holding positions that were traditionally reserved for them, felt threatened. This incident supports the general observation made by the International Crisis Group regarding post-conflict Ambon, "there is an obsession with communal balance".⁵²

This division is reflected in cultural attributes as well. Prior to the conflict, men were addressed as '*bung*' and women as '*usi*'. However, following the conflict, many Muslims have become reluctant to use these terms, believing them to be associated with Christians. Instead, they now use '*bang*' to address older men and '*caca*' for older women. Religious symbols have also become more visible in everyday life.⁵³ Not only do Christians wear eye-catching cross necklaces while going out, but they also distinguish themselves by other items they wear or consume. From their music to shoes, Christians prefer to be associated with Western cultural products. They display stickers of Western, Christian, or even Jewish symbols on their cars. On the other hand, Muslims associate themselves with Arabic attributes. Immediately following the conflict, people noticed that more Muslim women had begun wearing *jilbab* (hijab) and more Muslim men were wearing sandals and rolling their trousers above their ankles because the style is said to be Islamic. Men also let their beards grow, whereas the Christians tend to trim them. Entertainment artists that are associated with one religious group tend to be not favored by the other.

Christian-themed billboards and murals rose across Ambon's Christian territories as a way to both commemorate the hardships of the conflict and display Christian territory as well as religious identity.⁵⁴ When asked, a Christian minister confirmed this by comparing their street paintings with what Muslims do to exhibit their public presence: "It's the same. They don't make pictures much, but they wear headscarves as their own kind of special characteristic. To show that 'We are Muslims'. Yes, that's what stands out."⁵⁵ People in Maluku have developed the capacity to promptly distinguish between Christians and Muslims, whether from their appearances, names, or places of origin. As Richie, a Christian youth and Kadir's interlocutor said, "[p]reviously... [we] couldn't distinguish who was Acang

⁵⁰ The Malino Agreement never dictates that the number of Christian and Muslim official leaders should be in balance. However, this idea has become a common misconception in Maluku.

⁵¹ Pamungkas 2015.

⁵² International Crisis Group 2011.

⁵³ Kadir 2009.

⁵⁴ Spyer 2008.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

[his example of a Muslim individual] and who was Obet [his example of a Christian individual]. Now it's different. Just from our ways of talking, they're different now."⁵⁶

The sustained antagonism dangerously intensified when, in September 2011, a Muslim taxi motorcycle driver died in the Christian-populated district of Gunung Nona. While the local Christians explained that the driver died in an accident, local Muslims were convinced that Christians had killed him. This exacerbated the restlessness between both groups and rumors circulated by text message and word of mouth that another big riot reminiscent of 1999 was imminent. The Muslims who returned from the driver's funeral then attacked the Christians, which prompted retaliation from the Christians. A series of violent events involving the torching of houses and fighting between mobs erupted, lasting for two whole days before it stopped, albeit continuing with several isolated incidents. People rightly questioned whether peace had failed in Ambon, but this violence would also be the last great public clash to this day.

More recently, some of the mentioned Christian-Muslim divisions have begun to diminish, although more persist. Earlier on, Muslims from Southeast Sulawesi who experienced sudden displacement after living in Maluku for decades or even a century, often felt unwelcome and endangered, knowing that the locals could abruptly force them out. As one of the Southeast Sulawesi migrants said: "We have learned from these riots. When they try to throw us out the next time, we will be ready to stop them."⁵⁷ On the other hand, indigenous communities that fled the riots felt humiliated, as they had been uprooted from the land with which they have a historical and geographical connection, instead making them feel like migrants.⁵⁸ Based on my recent fieldwork among the Southeast Sulawesi migrants who settled in other parts of Maluku, I can confirm that such sentiments persist, albeit to a lesser extent. The suspicion and trust issues, which cause people to be hypervigilant⁵⁹ regarding any indications that those of different religions are conspiring against them, are still common. Christians and Muslims still tend to avoid each other and settle within their own territories, with no feasible way evident for them to return to living together.

On the other hand, locals are becoming increasingly less hesitant to employ common cultural attributes. Local celebrities and social media influencers increasingly produce content that is enjoyed by both Christians and Muslims. In 2018, Vicky Salamor, a Christian Ambonese singer, released a single titled "*Cinta Beda Agama*" ("Love between [People of] Different Religions"). The song was about someone who is involved in a romantic relationship with someone of a different religion, a common issue faced by Ambonese youth, and the single became a hit among young people, regardless of their religion. The lyrics tell the story of a man who loves his girlfriend deeply and believes their love will bring them together, despite their religious differences. Another interesting occurrence is how local Muslims have begun to use Christian religious expressions to convey their bafflement. When they are surprised, Christians in Maluku typically say "*Tuhan Allah*" ("Oh my God"), and some Muslims now like to playfully use this expression.

⁵⁶ Kadir 2009, 377.

⁵⁷ Adam 2010, 43.

⁵⁸ Adam 2008.

⁵⁹ Spyer 2002.

The Urge to Avoid Conflict

In the grand scheme of things, it is important to consider that not only has the conflict in Maluku led to an uneasy coexistence, it has also fostered the avoidance of conflict. People feel the fragility of peace, and, each in their own way, do not wish to upset the delicate balance. In December 2018, I missed my flight from Ambon to Jakarta after my connecting flight from Wahi to Ambon was unexpectedly canceled. I instead went by car from Wahi to Ambon, but ultimately arrived too late and had to spend the night there. Ibu Na, the Muslim headmaster of a school in Wahi, whom I had just met during my trip, kindly offered for me to stay at her home in Kebun Cengkeh, which had become Muslim territory following the conflict. There, I met her son Zul, who had graduated from Pattimura University a few years prior and now worked at the market. Zul showed me around Ambon, and we chatted while sightseeing. He eventually asked about my religion, which is a topic that is often avoided but necessary to clarify in order to avoid doing anything that may provoke conflicts, particularly since I was an outsider and it was hard to distinguish my beliefs. I told him that I am a Christian, to which he responded that Ambon is now peaceful and that both Christians and Muslims coexist in harmony.

Zul probably would have had a different response if I had not claimed to be a Christian. However, it was clear that regardless of my answer, he wanted me to feel secure in his presence. His response was illustrative of how people engage with those of different religions in Ambon. An attitude of caution prevails among them, as seen among Ambonese high school students.⁶⁰ Firstly, even though Ambon's young people, especially those aged under 20, did not experience the conflict themselves, older generations have told them of how dangerous those of different religions are, as well as how bleak life was during the conflict, transmitting their fear and trauma. Their parents have told them of how their relatives were killed by people of different religions, how individuals of different religions were greedy and robbed their houses during the riot, or how their communities had to expel followers of different religions who had long lived in close proximity to protect their own people. Some young people told to avoid people of different religions and to avoid going into their territories, and many are scared of being mistreated by their peers from different religions. When asked about what she understood about the conflict, Nadila, a Muslim high school student answered that "Muslim people are prohibited to go to the Christian areas, and vice versa."

Nevertheless, Tapotubun's interviews with young people from public schools around Ambon in 2019 revealed that many of them have friends from different religions, including close friends. They interact with their peers while avoiding conversations that could incite conflict. They understand the need to avoid behaviour that could be seen as disrespectful by those of other religions. Fahmy, another Muslim high school student, emphasized this point by saying, "Never do anything risky about religion, even if it's only a joke, because it can hurt others' feelings." Fahmy realized that the 1999 conflict resulted in many fatalities, and now, they must navigate religious differences carefully. Others like Diva said, "Your religion is your religion, my religion is my religion." With the

⁶⁰ Tapotubun 2019.

realization that religious differences can be dangerous, these youths avoid discussing religion with their friends. Tapotobun wrote that, “for those in social circles that involve a lot of differences (especially religion), religion is strictly forbidden to be discussed together.”

Kadir,⁶¹ who conducted his fieldwork a decade before Tapotobun, observed that Ambonese youth actively associated with friends from different religions shortly after the conflict. However, his interlocutors also maintained a tacit understanding of the need to prevent further conflict or simply remained cautious of those from different religions. They would not bring friends from different religions to socialize with their own communities, and would drink with friends from different religions at their places but did not want to stay past the afternoon due to feeling unsafe being in others’ territories at night. It is worth noting when surveyed by Pamungkas,⁶² Ambonese university students had a strong urge to avoid living near people from different religions when being surveyed, despite their openness to having relationships with them.

Wardani⁶³ found that the market traders in Mardika displayed a similar attitude following the re-integration of Christian traders in the mixed market in 2004. Both Christians and Muslims are open about not wanting conflict to repeat, feeling mutual victimization, and bonding against outsiders who incited the conflict and profited from their suffering. Nevertheless, there is a silent understanding not to discuss sensitive topics like religious and ethnic identities or disturbing events from the conflict. A few months into her fieldwork, Wardani realized that her boarding house was the first to be burned down during the riots, but people did not tell her because they did not want to revisit the traumatic past. The small alley where her boarding house was located was where the dead bodies of the victims were laid out, and there were many stories surrounding it, but people only wanted to share them when Wardani reassured them that she was the one who initiated the conversation and that they would not be reopening the topic on their own.

Educated city youths and market traders are expected to prefer maintaining interreligious relationships. They live in environments where bonding with others is better and more advantageous than separation, though such relationships can also result in uncomfortable and awkward moments. In enclaved settings, which are more typical in Maluku, the situation is different. Rural villagers, for example, often lack interest in interacting with those of different religions as they are not directly dependent on them economically. I observed that suspicion and animosity towards different religions are exhibited more openly in these settings. Nevertheless, post-conflict trauma has also cultivated the avoidance of religious disputes in these areas. This is why I now wish to draw our attention to a Butonese enclave in a rural setting and highlight their unique anxiety about religious conflict.

The Butonese are the largest Muslim migrant ethnic group in Maluku.⁶⁴ Their influx to the region contributed to the conflict, as their rapid growth disrupted the

⁶¹ Kadir 2009.

⁶² Pamungkas 2015.

⁶³ Wardani 2020.

⁶⁴ Ananta, Arifin, Hasbullah, Handayani and Pramono 2015.

Muslim-Christian power balance and threatened Christians, leading to the Butonese being the primary target of expulsion during the conflict. Although the Butonese originated from Buton island in Southeast Sulawesi, many have lived in Maluku for generations and no longer speak their native language. They have settled in both cities and villages throughout the region. In rural areas, they live in enclaves populated by their own ethnic group, under the jurisdiction of the indigenous villages. These enclaves began as small plantations or gardens but grew into settlements as the Butonese invited their relatives to join them. Often, the Butonese settlements became larger than their host indigenous villages. The Butonese typically obtained the right to settle on the land through a grant from the indigenous village, which sought to have Butonese settlements nearby as a buffer against enemy raids or to make the land productive.⁶⁵ However, due to their status as recipients of the indigenous villages' generosity and their roles as menial workers in the region, they were generally regarded as inferior by the locals.

This humble standing led the Butonese to develop a 'millenarian belief', that they will someday be freed from their degradation through the sudden revelation of the true history.⁶⁶ Among some Muslims in Maluku since the 1990s, there is a prevalent narrative that Christians,⁶⁷ who are known to have collaborated with Dutch colonizers in the past, fabricated history to present themselves as the indigenous people and dominant group in Maluku, concealing the true history of Muslims being the first inhabitants of the land and who fiercely defended it from Dutch colonization efforts. The Butonese adopted and adapted this narrative, believing that the revelation of the hidden history will disrupt the social order and restore the Butonese people's original dominance. They believe that there will be great chaos, but it will be followed by their triumph and the golden age of Butonese ascendancy.

During my fieldwork in Parigi, a rural Butonese enclave in Seram, I found that some of my interlocutors shared such a millenarian expectation. This expectation was appealing to them because it aligned with their struggles as an ethnic minority. They had been repeatedly humiliated by the locals and felt insecure about their place in Seram due to threats of expulsion during the conflict. The idea of being recognized as the original inhabitants of Seram and having the deception of the locals exposed was powerful and fulfilling. However, some of my interlocutors were conflicted about the idea of the revelation. This was because they could not help but associate it with the earlier local conflict. Despite their resentment towards Christians and locals, and despite their hope for a better life, they do not want another conflict as brutal as the one they experienced in the past. They aspire for the revelation that will disturb the social order but hope it will bring about only minimal conflict. This post-conflict desire to avoid further conflict was also evident in my Butonese acquaintance in Ambon. After his comments about history received hostile responses, he stated to me, "No, we do not want to cause a mess [through the revelation]. We only want to correct the misrepresentation of the Butonese

⁶⁵ Benda-Beckmann and Taale 1992.

⁶⁶ Riyanto 2020.

⁶⁷ See for instance Pattimura, Luthfi. 2016. Sejarah Pattimura: Benar Lawan Salah." *Tribun-Maluku.com*, May 25, 2016, <https://www.tribun-maluku.com/2016/05/sejarah-pattimura-benar-lawan-salah/>.

in history.” However, on other occasions, it was clear that he was anticipating a dramatic reversal of the Maluku hierarchy through the revelation.

Exercising Vigilance for Signs of Social Breakdown

For many, the violence that occurred in Ambon in September 2011 highlights several key developments in post-conflict Maluku. Most observers noted the fragility of peace in the region following the conflict.⁶⁸ People were still deeply hurt and divided due to the conflict, and thus an unrelated incident led to the spread of a baseless rumor, a Muslim rally, and days of widespread violence and frenzy. Despite this, civil society interventions aimed to ease the conflict through a new trend that occurred alongside the ongoing segregation. The 2011 clashes were exacerbated by rumors of burning churches and mosques, but these were quickly countered by a network of Christian activists known as *‘provokator damai’* (‘peace provocateurs’), who disproved the rumors by taking photographs of the unburned buildings. Although it is difficult to accurately assess the effectiveness of this effort to mitigate the spread of conflict, *provokator damai* received widespread praise and gained international recognition due to their work.

In the face of the seemingly constant threat of social disintegration, attention and resources—including cultural resources—are now allocated to respond to it. Another example of this tendency to intervene at the earliest signs of social breakdown is much more recent. On February 1, 2023, a minor clash occurred in Tual, Southeast Maluku. The clash was reported to have been caused by several drunken youths who refused to pay for their food and ended up hitting the owner of the food stall. This led to the family of the owner becoming angered. The incident was exacerbated by a hoax about a mosque being burned, which caused some Muslims to become upset and resulted in a large open brawl between two villages of different religions. Tens of houses were burned and 13 people were injured. In response, a group of women, both Christian and Muslim, rallied in the city center, singing together to encourage the people of Tual to maintain harmony and not be provoked by the conflict. A video of their rally was widely praised on Instagram, with many people expressing their admiration for the women putting their bodies on the line to protect the peace. Meanwhile, another video of the conflict was filled with comments from people who cursed the youths and others involved in the conflict. Some called for the video to be taken down to prevent baseless rumors that could escalate the conflict from spreading, as the situation in Tual had already improved greatly.

Minor intervillage conflicts are a common occurrence in Maluku, dating back long before the conflict. Their causes can range from border disputes to drunken altercations. However, post-conflict anxiety and segregation have led to a change in the way these conflicts are approached. There is a risk that these disputes may take on a religious tone, as settlements are divided along religious lines. What starts as a disagreement between members of different villages can escalate into ones involving religious symbols, as rumors of religious buildings being burned spread and more people become involved. Nevertheless, when such conflicts arise, many people are quick to prevent them from being labeled as religious. Journalists practice self-censorship to avoid reporting any

⁶⁸ International Crisis Group 2011.

information that may suggest a conflict has a religious dimension, and if such information does get reported, it is typically to dispel harmful rumors. Church officials also investigate the conflicts to uncover the root causes and work to promote peace through their local networks.

In January 2022, Kariu and Ori, two villages on Haruku Island, had a dispute that escalated into a large intervillage clash. The dispute, which resulted in the deaths of three individuals, the burning of hundreds of houses in Kariu, and the evacuation of Kariu residents to a neighboring village, was over the border between the two villages. This kind of dispute is important because it determines the extent of a village's territory and had fueled the spread of 1999 conflict in some areas.⁶⁹ The Kariu-Ori dispute started as a personal disagreement between two individuals from different villages, when a Kariu resident opened a garden and an Ori resident objected, claiming the garden was part of Kariu territory. Similar to the Tual conflict, religious sentiments were used to mobilize people and rumors of a religious clash spread beyond Haruku, even reaching Ambon, where people were rumored to be killing each other. As Kariu residents are Christian and Ori residents are Muslim, the religious sentiment caused Pelauw, a neighbouring Muslim settlement, to join Ori in their fight against Kariu. This was not the first time Kariu has faced such an incident. In February 1999, Kariu was destroyed, and its population was driven out after being attacked by nearby Muslim settlements.⁷⁰

As in Tual, other parties swiftly intervened to stop the escalation of the early 2022 conflict. Media coverages avoided mentioning religion as the cause of the clash, with some reports even claiming that it was not related to religion ("*bukan konflik SARA*", "not an ethnic, racial, religious, or intergroup conflict"). Church leaders in Ambon mobilized their network to calm the situation, and the Mayor of Ambon, Richard Louhenapessy, made a poignant statement regarding the conflict. He urged people to exercise restraint and avoid being drawn into provocations, saying: "*Damai itu sangat mahal*" ("Peace is very precious"). This served as a reminder of how, not long ago, Maluku was still in turmoil and peace was difficult to envision. Their current peaceful co-existence is fragile and should not be taken for granted.

Another outcome of post-conflict fear and trauma is the drive to showcase religious tolerance, which has also altered perspectives towards long-standing practices in Maluku. During Christmas, Muslim locals visit their Christian relatives and offer them Christmas greetings, which are reciprocated during Islamic holidays. In some parts of Maluku, people assist in constructing religious structures for neighboring villages or attend their religious rites, regardless of their religious differences. These practices, rooted in common ancestries or ancient alliances called '*pela*', have existed in Maluku for an extended period.⁷¹ Different villages that swore *pela*, originally as a war alliance against external threats like the Dutch, consider each other as siblings and have an obligation to provide support in various matters. This kind of relationship is also evident among neighboring villages with common ancestors. Despite this, not all individuals of different religions are extended interreligious hospitality, as it is based on past war

⁶⁹ Adam 2010, Adam 2013.

⁷⁰ Bräuchler 2014.

⁷¹ Bartels 1977, Huwae 1995, Bartels 2017, Bräuchler 2017.

alliances or common ancestries. Recent settlers, such as the Butonese, are not included in this hospitality, as they are considered inferior outsiders.⁷²

Today, these traditional expressions of siblinghood are celebrated by public figures and institutions as symbols of Malukan post-conflict tolerance or traditional ethos that enables their society to thrive as a diverse community. Local scholars and writers argue that they represent how Malukan values support peaceful coexistence between different religions. Traditional symbols of common ancestry are erected as public monuments to show the foundation of their society. This is so even though local observers emphasize that such expressions are not effective in establishing practical intercommunal peace, as they do not reflect their usage in their actual historical context.⁷³ In addition, there are now numerous formal gestures and events that promote acceptance of religious differences. For example, religious leaders and officials in Ambon took pride in the fact that the *Musabaqah Tilawatul Quran* (MTQ, the Indonesia International Quran Competition) and Ecclesiastical Choir Festival, two religious national events of the Muslims and the Christians, were held in Ambon in 2012 and 2015, respectively. These spectacles, particularly those promoted by officials, are as normative as it can get. However, it is interesting to see how long-standing practices of incorporating others are being reinterpreted as celebration of differences amid the need to suppress the sticking reality of the past conflict.

In light of the involvement and funding of government bodies in these initiatives, it is worth examining Barron's argument on the root causes of peace and conflict in post-conflict Maluku.⁷⁴ According to Barron, the primary reason behind peace and conflict in Maluku is due to elites maneuvering to secure financial resources and political positions. Not only are bureaucratic positions now much more evenly balanced between Christians and Muslims, but with the balance becoming an incontestable norm, government resources must also be divided evenly. Development projects and subsidies must be distributed evenly among different religious areas and through elites' networks of influence. The series of constant violence in the early 2000s ceased shortly after the approval of the IDR 300 billion post-conflict reconstruction fund by the national parliament. This kind of fund was known to be prone to embezzlement. At the same time, individuals who played a major role in the conflict were quickly given significant positions in post-conflict environments, such as that of chief of the Provincial Religious Affairs Office or director of Maluku's Islamic College (STAIN). There were indications that the police and military allowed some of the past violence to occur, thus taking advantage of the chaos. It is only understandable to assume that the prompt responses to conflict and peacekeeping efforts are due to the increased allocation of resources for these purposes.

Although some of Barron's arguments are stretched out, likely even citing the running conspiracy theories around Maluku, it is hard to argue against his analyses that are based on more robust materials. There was a notable reallocation of material resources following the conflict, and some segments of society capable of mobilizing the wider community indeed benefit from it. Nevertheless, while elite maneuvering and

⁷² Bartels 2000.

⁷³ Iwamony 2010.

⁷⁴ Barron 2019.

resource allocation must be accounted for in explaining precarious post-conflict peace, there is also a constant sense of urgency that constitutes the general vibe. The hurt left by the conflict is real. Common folks are genuinely afraid of any indications of social breakdown; this prompts them to partake in the prevention of religious conflicts within their capacities.

I would like to conclude this section by discussing a popular TikTok video that responded to a video made by an RMS activist of Malukan descent but who lives far away from Maluku. The original video, posted on Indonesian Independence Day in 2022, showed the activist calling for Malukans to demand independence from Indonesia, shouting “stop the exploitation in Maluku land!” The video was cut short by Malukan TikTok influencer Lendy Sapulette, who appears to be Christian, as he addressed the RMS activist as *‘usi’*. He rebuked the activist with a gentle but persuasive tone, pointing out that she only had a fragmented view of Maluku from a distance and that people in Maluku are now content with their current situation. Lendy added, “the 1999 riot taught us to live in harmony and peace with others.” He went on to say, that during the conflict “we ran around in a frenzy, bringing only the clothes on our bodies, sleeping on people’s terraces, seeking refuge. We were unable to sleep, eat, or attend school or work properly. And yet, you want us to kill each other again?”

During the conflict, Christians aligned with RMS, just as Muslims aligned with Laskar Jihad. One of the most challenging issues for Christian representatives to agree on during the Malino Treaty was the prohibition of RMS in Maluku. The Maluku Sovereignty Front (FKM), seen as a representation of the RMS and with the goal of supporting the independence of Maluku from Indonesia, embodied the protest against the injustice faced by the Christian community. Christians supported its presence and mission.⁷⁵ Two decades later, a Christian TikTok influencer dismissed an RMS activist with the comment, “if you want independence, you do it yourselves!” It is not impossible that the influencer was directed by the government or police to respond through his video, as using social media influencers as message carriers is a common practice in Indonesia. Nevertheless, Lendy’s trauma remains a reality among the people of Maluku until today.

Concluding Remarks

One goal of my analysis is to argue that peace is inherently imperfect. The normative tendency has led us to view peace as either ideal or flawed: a truly peaceful state should prioritize the well-being of its inhabitants, otherwise, it becomes a state of negative peace. Furthermore, the presence of bleak emotions such as fear is considered to make peaceful coexistence either impossible or problematic. This perspective is commonly held not only in peace studies but also among the people and observers of the Maluku region, suggesting that it is an intuitive understanding of peace. Whenever signs of social unrest appear, questions about the failure of peace in Maluku arise. These questions gained particular prominence with the September 2011 event, causing many, including those outside of Maluku, to claim that post-conflict Maluku is divided and

⁷⁵ Ernas 2012.

fragile.⁷⁶ Earlier suggestions regarding the idea of this paper also consistently inquire about the possibility of achieving peaceful coexistence, indicating that coexisting while holding fear and trauma toward each other is counterintuitive. It is probably not unlike the idea of a relationship without trust, which is considered impossible by Simmel.⁷⁷

However, the post-conflict reality in Maluku is far from comfortable. It is important to acknowledge that peaceful coexistence is about how to live together after a brutal and prolonged period of intercommunal violence. Although peace studies have been repeatedly deemed normative, it remains puzzling that various attempts to promote ideal peace fail to take into account the unavoidable lingering grievance of post-conflict societies. As such, bleak emotions must be expected to persist even when peaceful coexistence has been formally achieved. Rather than downplaying these emotions, it is necessary to understand how they operate in post-conflict environments. People must work with these feelings, and overcoming them may be impractical, as the feelings become embedded in the segregated social contexts and converge with practices connected to the reproduction of group solidarities.⁷⁸ In Maluku, fear and trauma have been the dominant emotions among residents for the past two decades. While these emotions contribute to the creation of differences and segregation, they also play a crucial role in preserving Christian-Muslim coexistence. Both ordinary individuals and officials are united by these emotions, causing them to think and feel similarly, with a recognition of the delicate nature of their current circumstances. Efforts to maintain peace in this region are thus driven by the fear of its collapse; people are kept together by a common anxiety.

Observations by other Indonesianists, such as Duncan⁷⁹ and Bertrand,⁸⁰ have hinted at what is described by this paper as a wider trend. Reconciliation efforts have been initiated in several places affected by the early post-New Order violence, but have rarely extended beyond limited segments of the communities, typically reaching only the elites. Such attempts highlight the very problem of liberal peacebuilding identified by peace scholars, as they are often driven by external parties and cater to their interests while excluding the interests of those directly affected by the conflicts and their everyday experiences.⁸¹ The common strategy adopted by ordinary people in grappling with the brutal past is to simply live with it while avoiding anything that may jeopardize their already flimsy coexistence and risk further social breakdown. Although such situations have indeed improved, such as in Maluku where people have become less vigilant toward others of different religions over time, nothing substantial has been resolved. Ethnic and religious cleavages remain as real as ever, and past violence can be easily evoked along with the dynamics of these divisions.

⁷⁶ Ansori, Sukandar, Peranto, Karib, Cholid and Rasyid 2014.

⁷⁷ Simmel 2009.

⁷⁸ Berliner 2013.

⁷⁹ Duncan 2016.

⁸⁰ Bertrand 2004.

⁸¹ Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013, Richmond 2009.

References

- Adam, Jeroen. 2008. "Forced Migration, Adat, and a Purified Present in Ambon, Indonesia". *Ethnology* 47(4): 227-238.
- Adam, Jeroen. 2010. "How Ordinary Folk Became Involved in the Ambonese Conflict: Understanding Private Opportunities During Communal Violence". *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 166(1): 25-48.
- Adam, Jeroen. 2013. *A Comparative Analysis on the Micro-Level Genealogies of Conflict in the Philippines' Mindanao Island and Indonesia's Ambon Island*. Oxford Development Studies 41(2): 155-172.
- Ali, Muhammad. 2011. "Muslim Diversity: Islam and Local Tradition in Java and Sulawesi, Indonesia". *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 1(1): 1-35.
- Ananta, Aris, Evi Nurvidya Arifin, M. Sairi Hasbullah, Nur Budi Handayani and Agus Pramono. 2015. *Demography of Indonesia's Ethnicity*. Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies.
- Ansori, Mohammad Hasan, Rudi Sukandar, Sopar Peranto, Fathun Karib, Sofyan Cholid and Imron Rasyid. 2014. *Segregasi, Kekerasan, dan Kebijakan Rekonstruksi Pasca-Konflik di Ambon*. Jakarta: The Habibie Center.
- Anwar, Khoirul. 2021. *Pancasila Village, Multicultural Education and Moderation of Diversity in Indonesia*. Nazhruna: Jurnal Pendidikan Islam 4(2): 221-234.
- Argenti, N. and K. Schramm, eds. 2009. *Remembering Violence: Anthropological Perspectives on Intergenerational Transmission*. Oxford/New York: Bergahn Books.
- Babo-Soares, Dionisio. 2004. "Nahe Biti: The Philosophy and Process of Grassroots Reconciliation (and Justice) in East Timor". *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* 5(1): 15-33.
- Barron, Patrick. 2019. *When Violence Works: Postconflict Violence and Peace in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Bartels, Dieter. 1977. "Guarding the Invisible Mountain: Intervillage Alliances, Religious Syncretism and Ethnic Identity among Ambonese Christians and Moslems in the Moluccas." PhD thesis. Cornell University.
- Bartels, Dieter. 2000. "Your God Is No Longer Mine": Moslem-Christians Fratricide in the Central Moluccas (Indonesia) after a Half-Millennium of Tolerant Co-Existence and Ethnic Unity. In *A State of Emergency: Violence, Society and the State in Eastern Indonesia*, ed. Sandra Pannell. Darwin: Northern Territory University Press, 128-153, e-version available at <http://www.nunusaku.com>.
- Bartels, Dieter. 2017. *Di Bawah Naungan Gunung Nunusaku: Muslim Kristen Hidup Berdampingan di Maluku Tengah* (Jilid 1: Kebudayaan) [under the Shadow of Nunusaku: Christians-Muslims Living Together in Central Maluku Vol. 1]. Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia.
- Benda-Beckmann, Franz von and Tanja Taale. 1992. "The Changing Laws of Hospitality: Guest Labourers in the Political Economy of Rural Legal Pluralism". In *Law as a Resource in Agrarian Struggles*, eds. Franz von Benda-Beckmann and M. van der Velde. Wageningen: Agricultural University Wageningen, 61-87.
- Berents, Helen and Siobhan McEvoy-Levy. 2015. *Theorising Youth and Everyday Peace (Building)*. Peacebuilding 3(2): 115-125.
- Berliner, David. *Four Propositions to Study Memory*. Culanth, <https://db.hypotheses.org/44>.
- Bertrand, J. 2004. *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boulding, Kenneth E. 1977. *Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung*. *Journal of Peace Research* 14(1): 75-86.
- Boulding, Kenneth E. 1978. *Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies*. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22(2): 342-354.

- Braithwaite, John. 2013. "Maluku: Anomie to Reconciliation". In *Diminishing Conflicts in Asia and the Pacific: Why Some Subside and Others Don't*, eds. Edward Aspinall, Robin Jeffrey and Anthony J. Regan. London: Routledge, 37-48.
- Bräuchler, Birgit. 2014. "Christian-Muslim Relations in Post-Conflict Ambon, Moluccas: Adat, Religion and Beyond". In *Religious Diversity in Muslim-Majority Southeast Asia: Areas of Toleration and Conflict*, eds. Berhnhard Platzdach and Johan Saravanamuttu. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 154-172.
- Bräuchler, Birgit. 2017. "Changing Patterns of Mobility, Citizenship and Conflict in Indonesia". *Social Identities* 23(4): 1-16.
- Bräuchler, Birgit and Philipp Naucke. 2017. "Peacebuilding and Conceptualisations of the Local". *Social Anthropology* 25(4): 422-436.
- Burchert, Sebastian, Nadine Stammel and Christine Knaevelsrud. 2017. "Transgenerational Trauma in a Post-Conflict Setting: Effects on Offspring PTSS/PTSD and Offspring Vulnerability in Cambodian Families". *Psychiatry Research* 254: 151-157.
- Canetti, Daphna, Gilad Hirschberger, Carmit Rapaport, Julia Elad-Strenger, Tsachi Ein-Dor, Shifra Rosenzweig, Tom Pyszczynski and Stevan E. Hobfoll. 2018. "Collective Trauma from the Lab to the Real World: The Effects of the Holocaust on Contemporary Israeli Political Cognitions". *Political Psychology* 39(1): 3-21.
- Carey, Matthew. 2017. *Mistrust: An Ethnographic Theory*. London: HAU Books.
- Clark, Janine Natalya. 2009. "From Negative to Positive Peace: The Case of Bosnia and Hercegovina". *Journal of Human Rights* 8(4): 360-384.
- Cohen-Chen, Smadar, Eran Halperin, Roni Porat and Daniel Bar-Tal. 2014. "The Differential Effects of Hope and Fear on Information Processing in Intractable Conflict". *Journal of Social and Political Psychology* 2(1): 11-30.
- Cremin, Hilary and Terence Bevington. 2017. *Positive Peace in Schools: Tackling Conflict and Creating a Culture of Peace in the Classroom*. London: Routledge.
- De Certeau, Michel. 1984. *The Practice of Everyday Life*. California: The University of California Press.
- Du Toit, Fanie. 2017. "A Broken Promise? Evaluating South Africa's Reconciliation Process Twenty Years On". *International Political Science Review* 38(2): 169-184.
- Duncan, Christopher R. 2016. "Coexistence Not Reconciliation: From Communal Violence to Non-Violence in North Maluku, Eastern Indonesia". *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* 17(5): 460-474.
- E-International Relations. "Interview - Roger Mac Ginty." *E-International Relations*, <https://www.e-ir.info/2022/07/15/interview-roger-mac-ginty/>.
- Ellen, Roy. 2014. "Pragmatism, Identity and the State: How the Nuaulu of Seram Have Re-Invented Their Beliefs and Practices as 'Religion'". *Wacana: Jurnal Ilmu Pengetahuan Budaya* 15(2): 254-285.
- Ernas, Saidin. 2012. "Policy of Social Conflict Resolution: Implementation of the Malino Agreement in Maluku". *Jurnal Studi Pemerintahan* 3(2): 316-344.
- Galtung, Johan. 1967. *Theories of Peace: A Synthetic Approach to Peace Thinking*. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute.
- Gellman, Mneesa. 2008. "No Justice, No Peace? National Reconciliation and Local Conflict Resolution in Cambodia". *Asian Perspective* 32(2): 37-57.
- Geschiere, Peter. 2003. "Witchcraft as the Dark Side of Kinship: Dilemmas of Social Security in New Contexts". *Etnofoor* 16(1): 43-61.
- Halperin, Eran. 2015. *Emotions in Conflict: Inhibitors and Facilitators of Peace Making*. London: Routledge.
- Harris, Ian M. 2004. "Peace Education Theory". *Journal of Peace Education* 1(1): 5-20.
- Hirschberger, Gilad and Tsachi Ein-Dor. 2020. "A Temporal Account of Collective Victimization as

- Existential Threat: Reconsidering Adaptive and Maladaptive Responses". In *The Social Psychology of Collective Victimhood*, ed. J.R. Vollhardt. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 100-119.
- Huwae, Sylvia. 1995. "Divided Opinions About Adatpela: A Study of Pela Tamilou-Siri-Sori-Hutumuru". *Cakalele* 6: 77-92.
- Institute for Economics and Peace 2022. *Global Peace Index 2022: Measuring Peace in a Complex World*. Sydney.
- International Crisis Group. "Indonesia: Rusuh Lagi di Ambon." *International Crisis Group*, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/id/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/indonesia-trouble-again-ambon>.
- Iwamony, Rachel. 2010. "The Reconciliatory Potential of the Pela in the Moluccas: The Role of GPM in This Transformation Process." PhD thesis. Vrije University of Amsterdam.
- Jarymowicz, Maria and Daniel Bar-Tal. 2006. "The Dominance of Fear over Hope in the Life of Individuals and Collectives". *European Journal of Social Psychology* 36(3): 367-392.
- Jong, J.T.V.M. de, I.H. Komproe, M. Van Ommeren, M. E. Masri, M. Araya, N. Khaled, W. van De Put and D. Somansundaram. 2001. *Lifetime Events and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in 4 Postconflict Settings*. *JAMA* 286(5): 555-562.
- Kadir, Hatib Abdul. 2009. *Bergaya di Kota Konflik: Mencari Akar Konflik Ambon Melalui Gaya Hidup Anak Muda*. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar.
- Klinken, Gerry van. 2007. *Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars*. London: Routledge.
- Lake, David A and Donald Rothchild. 1996. "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict". *International Security* 21(2): 41-75.
- Mac Ginty, Roger and Oliver P Richmond. 2013. "The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for Peace". *Third World Quarterly* 34(5): 763-783.
- Maoz, Ifat and Clark McCauley. 2008. "Threat, Dehumanization, and Support for Retaliatory Aggressive Policies in Asymmetric Conflict". *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(1): 93-116.
- Marthoenis, Inong Meutia, Hizir Sofyan and Meryam Schouler-Ocak. 2018. "Exposure to Traumatic Events and PTSD in a Postconflict and Disaster-Prone Area". *Journal of Loss and Trauma* 23(2): 128-139.
- Morfit, Michael. 1981. "Pancasila: The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government". *Asian Survey* 21(8): 838-851.
- Mühlfried, Florian. 2018. "Introduction: Approximating Mistrust". In *Mistrust: Ethnographic Approximations*, ed. Florian Mühlfried. transcript Verlag, 7-22.
- Murithi, Tim. 2009. "An African Perspective on Peace Education: Ubuntu Lessons in Reconciliation". *International Review of Education* 55: 221-233.
- Pamungkas, Cahyo. 2015. "Intergroup Contact Avoidance in Indonesia." PhD thesis. Radboud University.
- Putnam, Robert D. 2000. "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital". *Journal of Democracy* 6(1): 65-78.
- Racioppi, Linda and Katherine O'Sullivan See. 2007. "Grassroots Peace-Building and Third-Party Intervention: The European Union's Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland". *Peace & change* 32(3): 361-390.
- Ramage, Douglas E. 1997. *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance*. London: Routledge.
- Richmond, Oliver P. 2009. "Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming Liberalism: Liberal-Local Hybridity Via the Everyday as a Response to the Paradoxes of Liberal Peacebuilding". *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 3(3): 324-344.
- Riyanto, Geger. 2020. "Revelation and Misunderstanding: Buton Millenarianism and the Interchange

- of Cosmological Tropes in North Seram, Maluku, Indonesia". *Indonesia and the Malay World* 48(142): 1-15.
- Rohman, Abdul. 2020. "How Information Sharing at Information Grounds Helps Reconnect a Religiously Divided Society? Cafés, Christians and Muslims in Ambon, Indonesia." *Journal of Documentation* 76(6): 1155-1180.
- Rumahuru, Yance Zadrak and Agustinus CW Gaspersz. 2021. "Community Based Diversity Management: Analysis of Community Activities Building Post-Conflict Social Harmony in Tual, Maluku Province, Indonesia." *Humaniora* 33(1): 39-49.
- Ryan, Stephen. 2013. "The Evolution of Peacebuilding." In *Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding*, ed. Roger Mac Ginty. London: Routledge, 25-35.
- Sabucedo, José-Manuel, Mónica Alzate Mar Durán and María-Soledad Rodríguez. 2011. "Emotional Responses and Attitudes to the Peace Talks with Eta." *Revista Latinoamericana de Psicología* 43(2): 289-296.
- Shields, Patricia M. 2017. "Limits of Negative Peace, Faces of Positive Peace." *Parameters* 47(3): 5-12.
- Simmel, Georg. 2009. *Sociology: Inquiries into the Construction of Social Forms* Volume 1. Leiden: Brill.
- Spyer, Patricia. 2002. "Fire without Smoke and Other Phantoms of Ambon's Violence: Media Effects, Agency, and the Work of Imagination." *Indonesia* 74: 21-36.
- Spyer, Patricia. 2008. "Blind Faith: Painting Christianity in Postconflict Ambon." *Social Text* 26(3): 11-37.
- Suffla, Shahnaaz, Nick Malherbe and Mohamed Seedat. 2020. "Recovering the Everyday within and for Decolonial Peacebuilding through Politico-Affective Space". In *Researching Peace, Conflict, and Power in the Field: Methodological Challenges and Opportunities*, eds. Yasemin Gülsüm, Acar Sigrun Marie Moss and Özden Melis Uluğ. Cham: Springer, 343-364.
- Tapotubun, Harry Harlen. 2019. "Legacy of Conflict and the Challenge of Reconciliation: The Transmission of Conflict through Narrative among Youth in Ambon." Master Thesis. Universitas Gadjah Mada.
- Wardani, Abellia Anggi. 2020. "It Was Kind of Safe": The Role of the Market in the Everyday Peacebuilding Processes During the Ambon Conflicts." PhD thesis. Tilburg University.
- Warner, Ruth H., Michael J.A. Wohl and Nyla R. Branscombe. 2014. "When Do Victim Group Members Feel a Moral Obligation to Help Suffering Others?" *European Journal of Social Psychology* 44(3): 231-241.
- Wilker, Sarah, Anett Pfeiffer, Stephan Kolassa, Daniela Koslowski, Thomas Elbert and Iris-Tatjana Kolassa. 2015. "How to Quantify Exposure to Traumatic Stress? Reliability and Predictive Validity of Measures for Cumulative Trauma Exposure in a Post-Conflict Population". *European Journal of Psychotraumatology* 6(1)